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Hamburg Group for Private International Law∗ 
COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S  
DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION  
ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 2002, the Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs of the European 
Commission published a “Consultation on a Preliminary Draft Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations”, hereinafter entitled EC 
Draft Proposal (DP).1 This Draft Proposal is another important step in the series of efforts to 
codify the private international law of obligations within the European Community. While the 
first initiative in the 1970s to codify private international law within the EU aimed at a 
comprehensive regulation of the conflict rules relating to both contractual and non-contractual 
obligations2 and even to property law consensus among the Member States could then only be 
achieved in respect of the former subject. As a result, the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 
is in fact limited to the law applicable to contractual obligations.3 Since its adoption several 
European States such as Germany,4 Italy,5 Switzerland6 and the United Kingdom7 have also 
enacted legislation providing for the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. As these 
national legislators codify existing differences between national conflict rules and reduce the 
                                                          
∗  The Hamburg Group for Private International Law is composed of scholars affiliated with 
the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law (Jürgen Basedow 
[coord.], Felix Blobel, Jana Essebier, Jan von Hein, Axel Metzger, Ralf Michaels, Hans-
Jürgen Puttfarken, Jürgen Samtleben, Judith Schnier, Simon Schwarz) and with the Seminar 
of Foreign Private and Private International Law of the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Hamburg (Ulrich Magnus, Peter Mankowski). 
1  See «http://www.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/civil/consultation/index_en.htm». 
2  See Ole Lando/Bernd von Hoffmann/Kurt Siehr, European Private International Law of 
Obligations (1975). 
3  Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Done at Rome on 19 June 
1980, O.J.E.C. L 266, 09/10/1980, 1-19. 
4  Gesetz zum IPR für außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse und Sachen v. 21.5.1999, BGBl. 
1999 I, 1026. 
5  Legge di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, 31.5.1995, n. 218; 
Gazz. Uff., Suppl. ord. n. 128, 3.6.1995. 
6  Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht, 18 December 1987, BBl. 1988 I 5 = AS 
1988, 1776. 
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ability of national judges to harmonize existing rules, it becomes even more apparent that time 
has come to codify the matter at the European level. The need for harmonization has been 
confirmed by the “Groupe européen de droit international privé” (GEDIP) which published a 
proposal for a European measure relating to the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
in 1998.8 It is this proposal in particular which, in combination with the Rome convention, has 
served as guidance to the European Commission in preparing the EC Draft Proposal under 
scrutiny. The Hamburg Group for Private International Law therefore welcomes and strongly 
supports the initiative of the Commission to codify further parts of private international law. 
Unlike the Rome Convention, the EC Draft Proposal is framed as a regulation, i.e. as an 
instrument of secondary EC legislation. Thereby, the Commission points out that it wants to 
avail itself of the powers vested in the Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam in the field of 
private international law, see arts. 61 and 65 EC. These powers enable the Community to 
adopt “measures”, a term which encompasses all types of Community acts listed in art. 249 
EC including regulations. The Hamburg Group supports the choice of this instrument. As 
opposed to directives which have to be implemented by national provisions and often fall 
short of their objectives regulations do not encourage Member States to maintain as much of 
the pre-existing national law as possible. 
However, in many other aspects the extent of the Community powers under art. 65 EC is 
under debate. While some believe that art. 65 EC is restricted to intra-Community fact 
situations,9 others hold that art. 65 EC would permit the adoption of private international law 
acts having a universal purview.10 The Hamburg Group will not dwell on this issue, but it 
should be pointed out that in its opinion a division of private international law into one body 
of intra-Community rules enacted by the Community and a second body of rules for third-
state relations adopted by the Member States would be disturbing. Long-standing experience 
with legal practice in this field shows that lower courts having little expertise in private 
international law have to carry the biggest share of the case-load. The state of knowledge is by 
no means better in private legal practice. The complexity and, compared to purely internal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7  Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (c. 42). 
8  See «http://www.drt.ucl.ac.be/gedip»; see Eur. Rev. Priv. L. 7 (1999) 45 seq. for the English 
and French versions of the proposal. 
9  Oliver Remien, European Private International Law, the European Community and Its 
Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Common Market Law Review 2001, 53-
86, at 75/76. 
10  Jürgen Basedow, The Communitarisation of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, Common Market Law Review 2000, 687-708, at 701 et seq. 
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cases, the relative scarcity of transborder lawsuits would require a specialization of lawyers 
which cannot be attained for the whole of the Community territory. Therefore everything 
should be done to avoid further complications of the discipline. Doubling the legal sources 
would do more harm to the international harmony of decisions, than can be outweighed by the 
possible benefit of conserving national competencies for the regulation of third-state relations. 
These observations are of particular relevance to art. 2 DP. 
When the Commission published its Draft Proposal it pursued the goal of launching a public 
debate on a future Community instrument on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations. The Commission has in fact invited all interested parties to present their 
comments by 15 September 2002. The following observations are meant to contribute to that 
debate. They are the result of several meetings of scholars affiliated with the Max-Planck-
Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law and with the University of 
Hamburg, held from June to September 2002. They do not purport to be comprehensive or 
complete. Our comments concentrate on some issues that appeared particularly important to 
the members of our group. For a complete discussion more time would have been required. 
We have tried to focus our comments as much as possible on alternative proposals which, 
where applicable, will be reproduced in italicised print next to the EC Draft Proposal. While 
the proposals have undergone several discussion rounds and reflect the majority opinion in the 
group, not all of them have been approved unanimously. 
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TITLE I   –   SCOPE 
Article 1 – Scope Article 1 – Substantive scope of application 
1.  The rules of this Regulation shall apply to 
non-contractual obligations in any situation 
involving a choice between the laws of 
different countries. 
No changes 
2.  They shall not apply to:  
(a)  non-contractual obligations arising out of 
a family relationship or a relationship deemed 
to be equivalent, including maintenance 
obligations to the extent that they are 
governed by specific rules; 
(b)  non-contractual obligations governed by 
the law of succession; 
(c)  obligations arising under bills of 
exchange, cheques and promissory notes and 
other negotiable instruments to the extent that 
the obligations under such other negotiable 
intruments arise out of their negotiable 
character; 
(d)  the personal liability of officers, of 
members, and of persons responsible for 
carrying out the statutory audits of accounting 
documents, for the obligations of a company 
or body incorporate or unincorporate; 
(e)  liability incurred in the exercise of public 
authority; 
(f)  non-contractual obligations among the 
settlers, trustees and beneficiaries of a trust; 
(g)  evidence and procedure, without 
prejudice to Article 17. 
See comment no. 1 
C O M M E N T S 
1.  Reduction of the number of exclusions. Art. 1(2) DP excludes a great many legal 
relationships from the scope of the future regulation. Most of these exclusions are tailored on 
the model of art. 1(2) of the Rome Convention. In that convention it was necessary to exclude 
certain legal relations which are equally based upon agreement, but are generally 
characterized as forming part of another area of the law such as company law, family relations 
or the law of succession. The contractual relations encountered in these areas should in fact be 
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subject to the same national law that is applicable to other issues of company law, family law 
or the law of succession. In the future regulation of the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations the escape clause of art. 3(3) DP (see art. 11a of the Hamburg alternative 
proposal) allows for applying one and the same law to the non-contractual obligation and to 
the underlying legal relation pertaining to another area; the subordination of the applicable 
law to the law governing other relations such as those flowing from company or family law is 
clearly spelt out in subparagraph 2 of that provision. The exclusion of those relations from the 
scope of the future regulation would therefore be unnecessary in order to attain the goal of a 
synchronisation of the applicable laws. For example, the fraudulent evasion of maintenance 
obligations may give rise to a liability sounding in tort in some countries. If the exclusion 
contained in art. 1(2)(a) DP is deleted a judge applying art. 3 DP to such claims in transborder 
cases would certainly subordinate the tort claim to the same national law that is governing the 
maintenance obligation itself, art. 3(3) subpara. 2 DP (see art. 11a(2) of the Hamburg 
alternative proposal). Without going into the details the Hamburg Group recommends that the 
Commission once more check the need for each of the exclusions contained in art. 1(2) DP, 
and in particular the need for lett. (a), (c), (d) and (f). 
2.  Exclusion of liability for nuclear damage? The issue of civil liability for nuclear 
incidents is not expressly excluded from the scope of the proposed Regulation as defined by 
art. 1 DP.  
Earlier proposals for an international convention or, indeed, an EC instrument on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations generally excluded liability for nuclear damage from 
their respective scope of application. This is true both for the 1972 preliminary draft of an EC 
Convention on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations (art. 1(f))11, 
and the internal proposal by the European Commission from 1999 for an EC Regulation 
(art. 1(2)(f)). A provision to the same effect is found in the proposal drawn up by GEDIP in 
1998 (art. 1(2)(d)). Against this background, the omission of a similar clause in the draft 
proposal now under discussion must be interpreted to mean that the proposed regulation is 
indeed intended to cover liability for nuclear incidents.  
This inevitably raises the question of how the proposed regulation would affect the operation 
of those international agreements dealing specifically with civil nuclear liability, that are 
already in place. Most important among these agreements is the so-called Paris Convention, 
                                                          
11See supra, at n. 2. 
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dating from 1960.12 Drawn up under the auspices of the OEEC (now OECD), it has been 
signed and ratified by all EU Member States with the exception of Austria, Luxemburg and 
Ireland, all of which do not have any commercial nuclear installations within their borders. 
Contracting states from outside the EU are Turkey, Slovenia and Norway. In 1963, a further 
international agreement on civil nuclear liability was negotiated and signed in Vienna. The 
Vienna Convention,13 which aimed at a potentially global participation, is currently in force in 
32 countries, many of them in central and eastern Europe. These two liability conventions are 
„linked“ by the „Joint Protocol“ of 198814 which extends compensation under the Paris 
Convention to damage suffered in a Vienna Convention state and vice versa.  
Both liability conventions adhere to similar principles: liability for nuclear incidents is 
„channelled“ onto the operator of the nuclear installation causing the damage and exclusive 
jurisdiction for all claims resulting from any one nuclear incident is granted to the courts of 
the contracting state in whose territory the nuclear incident occurred (Paris Convention, 
art. 13(a); Vienna Convention, art. XI(1)). Liability is irrespective of fault and limited in 
amount. It is left to the law of each contracting state to fix the maximum level of liability for 
operators of nuclear installations within that state’s borders (Paris Convention, art. 7; Vienna 
Convention, art. V(1)). Virtually all national laws provide for state intervention on some level 
of the compensation regime: either the state acts as guarantor for the operator’s obligation, or 
it directly compensates victims of a nuclear incident if the damage exceeds the operator’s 
liability limit or the operator is exonerated from liability.  
Pursuant to art. 11 in combination with art. 14(b) of the Paris Convention, the nature, form 
and extent of the compensation as well as the equitable distribution thereof, shall be governed 
by the national law of the court having jurisdiction under the convention. The lex fori shall 
also apply to all matters – both substantive and procedural – not specifically governed by the 
convention itself (Paris Convention, art. 14(b)). Again, similar provisions are contained in the 
Vienna Convention. This reference to the law of the competent court is understood by the vast 
majority of legal writers to include the choice-of-law-provisions of the lex fori. According to 
this view, the court having jurisdiction under art. 13 of the Paris Convention, may therefore 
have to apply a foreign law to some aspects of a claim brought under the convention, if a 
                                                          
12 Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 
BGBl. 1975 II, 959, 1007. 
13 Vienna Convention of 21 May 1963 on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, BGBl. 2001 II, 
202, 207. 
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nuclear installation in the forum state causes damage in another country. For example, if an 
incident in a nuclear power station in England causes damage in France, the French claimants 
must sue the English operator in England due to the rule of exclusive jurisdiction in art. 13(a) 
of the Paris Convention. However, under the relevant English choice of law rules the law of 
the country where the injury or damage was sustained may apply, i.e. French law.15 Therefore, 
the „nature, form and extent of the compensation“ and its equitable distribution as well as 
those issues on which the convention is silent, would appear to be governed by French law. If, 
however, the choice of law rules of the lex fori refer to the law of the place where the 
tortfeasor acted, as is the general rule under German law the claim for compensation remains 
wholly governed by the substantive provisions of the lex fori and those of the Paris 
Convention itself.16 According to a minority view, however, the reference in arts. 14(b) and 
11 of the Paris Convention is interpreted as referring only to the substantive provisions of the 
law of the competent court, i.e. excluding that law’s choice of law rules altogether. As a 
result, the courts of the Member State having jurisdiction under art. 13 of the Paris 
Convention would only apply its own substantive law and the rules of the Convention. 
Pursuant to the prevailing view on the nature of the reference in arts. 14(b) and 11, the effect 
of the proposed regulation in such cases would be to harmonise the interaction between the 
rules of the Paris Convention and national choice of law rules with the obvious exception of 
those countries that are party to the Paris Convention but outside the EU. In every case of 
transborder nuclear damage, the competent court would – on the premise of the 
abovementioned majority view – have to apply the law of the place where the damage was 
suffered to the extent prescribed by the Convention, according to art. 3(1) DP or, if the term 
„violation of the environment“ is meant to include nuclear emissions, art. 8 DP. This effect of 
the proposed Regulation is welcomed, despite the fact that the exact scope of the reference to 
the lex fori and the interplay between the rules laid down in the Convention and the national 
law of the contracting states remains somewhat unclear. Yet even if only a small scope of 
application remains for national choice of law rules, it would certainly be beneficiary, if these 
rules were the same in all or nearly all contracting states. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 Joint Protocol of 21 September 1988 Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention 
and the Paris Convention, BGBl. 2001 II, 786. 
15  Section 11 PIL (MP) Act 1995, supra, at n. 7. This general rule is subject to an exception 
under section 12. 
16 Of course, the claimant can demand the application of the law of the country where the 
damage was sustained, cf. art. 40(1) EGBGB, supra, at n. 4. 
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What would be the effect of the proposed Regulation on nuclear liability cases outside the 
framework of the Paris Convention? Again, this may be illustrated, at least in broad outline, 
by way of an example: a nuclear power station in the Czech Republic – as yet and for the 
purpose of this example a non-EU State, where the proposed Regulation would have no 
immediate application – causes damage in Germany and Austria. The situation in relation to 
victims in Germany is, at least in theory, quite straightforward. Since the Czech Republic is 
party to both the Vienna Convention and – like Germany – the Joint Protocol, all German 
compensation claims come under the regime of the Vienna Convention (art. 3 of the Joint 
Protocol provides that in a „conflict of conventions“ that convention prevails to which the 
state, where the liable nuclear installation is situated, is a party). As a result, all claims would 
have to be brought in the Czech Republic and the operator is liable under the rules set up by 
the Vienna Convention. Claims by Austrian victims, on the other hand, are not within the 
ambit of either nuclear liability convention: Austria has signed neither the Paris nor the 
Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention by itself does not cover damage in non-
contracting-states. Therefore, if an action for compensation is brought before an Austrian 
court, the applicable law would have to be determined according to the general rules on 
choice of law for torts, i.e. the rules of the proposed Regulation. Whether the resulting 
judgment, based on Austrian liability law, is enforceable in the Czech Republic, is, of course, 
a different question. 
Whether much would be gained by the application of the proposed Regulation in a case such 
as the one just mentioned, is questionable. The courts in those states that are outside the 
liability framework established by the Paris and the Vienna Convention, such as Austria, will, 
it is submitted, usually find a way to apply their own law to claims concerning damage 
suffered in those states on the basis of their national law as it stands. This can be achieved by 
applying either the general choice of law rules which, at least in cases of environmental 
violations, quite often tend to point to the law of the place where the damage was suffered, or 
those choice of law provisions contained in national legislation that are specifically designed 
to deal with transborder nuclear damage (see, e.g., section 23(1) of the 1999 Austrian Act on 
Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage17). However, as in relation to intra-community 
cases, uniform conflict rules applicable to transboundary nuclear emissions would achieve 
harmonised results to the extent that the general choice-of-law rules remain relevant.  
                                                          
17 Bundesgesetz über die zivilrechtliche Haftung für Schäden durch Radioaktivität, 1.1.1999, 
AtomHG 1999, BGBl No. I 170/1998. 
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As an overall conclusion, therefore, the issue of civil nuclear liability should not be excluded 
from the scope of the Regulation. 
Article 2 – Universal application 
Any law specified by this Regulation shall be 
applied whether or not it is the law of a 
Member State. 
No changes 
C O M M E N T 
See the Introduction, above at footnotes 9 and 10. 
23.09.02 12:55 10
TITLE II   –   UNIFORM  RULES 
CHAPTER 1 
 
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
DERIVING FROM A TORT OR 
DELICT 
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
DERIVING FROM A TORT, DELICT 
OR QUASI-DELICT 
 
Article 3 – General Rule 
1.  The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort or delict shall 
be the law of the country in which the loss is 
sustained, irrespective of the country or 
countries in which the harmful event occurred 
and irrespective of the country in which the 
indirect consequences of the harmful event 
are sustained, subject to paragraph 2. 
1. Subject to paragraph 2, the law applicable 
to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
tort, delict or quasi-delict shall be the law of 
the country in which the injury is, or may be, 
suffered, irrespective of the country or 
countries in which the act giving rise to 
liability was committed and irrespective of the 
country in which any consequential loss 
resulting from the injury is sustained. 
2.  Where the author of the tort or delict and 
the injured party have their habitual residence 
in the same country when the tort or delict is 
committed, the applicable law shall be the law 
of that country. 
2. Where the author of the tort or delict or 
quasi-delict and the injured party have their 
habitual residence in the same country when 
the tort or delict is committed, the applicable 
law shall be the law of that country. 
3.  However, if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that there is a 
substantially closer connection with another 
country and there is no significant connection 
between the non-contractual obligation and 
the country whose law would be the 
applicable law under paragraphs 1 and 2, the 
law of that other country shall be applicable.  
A substantially closer connection with another 
country may be based in particular on a pre-
existing relationship between the parties, such 
as a contract that is linked to the tort or delict 
in question. 
3.  Replaced by new art. 11a  
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C O M M E N T S 
1.  The basic approach. The Hamburg Group approves of the basic approach of art. 3(1) 
DP, but proposes some improvements of formulation for the sake of clarity. 
The starting point of any liability sounding in tort is a damage which a person, the victim, has 
to sustain involuntarily and that s/he, in order to get compensation and/or its termination, tries 
to ascribe to another person’s, the actor’s behaviour which is claimed to have encroached 
upon the victim’s protected interests without his or her consent. In a free society, the 
paramount weight concerning the applicable law must be attributed to the involuntary 
sufferance of the victim rather than the actor’s reliance on a given legal system. The actor 
may trust in the law of the place of acting insofar as the consequences within that state are 
concerned, but s/he is not entitled to avail himself/herself of that law in respect of 
consequences occurring in other countries. 
The victim’s legitimate expectations focus on the protection accorded by the law of the 
country where s/he gets involved with the public intercourse and, thereby, exposes his/her 
rights and interests to potential infringements. This expectation is legitimate since it is 
cognisable for actors even if resident or acting abroad. The victim may also wish to invoke the 
law of the state where the acts giving rise to non-contractual liability have been perpetrated if 
that law accords a better protection. But since the place of acting is determined by the actor 
and is purely accidental for the victim the latter’s expectation to have the law of that place 
applied cannot be said to be legitimate. A similar assessment has to be made in respect of the 
law of a country or countries where the indirect consequences of the injury such as the 
consequential, in particular the financial loss flowing from the infringement (cost of healing 
etc.) are sustained. The link between these countries and the events causing the loss may 
consist of the habitual residence of the victim injured in another country, a bank account or 
another contractual arrangement which is usually unknown and not cognisable to the actor at 
the time when he committed the relevant acts. Accordingly, s/he should not be held liable for 
the violation of national laws which s/he had no reason to take into consideration at the time 
he acted.  
An exception is appropriate if both the actor and the victim are connected, by their habitual 
residences, to one and the same country, art. 3(2) DP, or if other facts indicate a closer 
connection to a state different from the country of injury, art. 3(3) DP (see also below, at 
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comment no. 5 seq.). It appears equally useful to supplement the basic rule by definitions of 
the place of injury and of some further corrections for specific types of tort or delict.  
2.  Terminology. Art. 3(1) DP is based upon the identification of three elements of a tort or 
delict or quasi-delict: the act or event giving rise to liability, the injury suffered by the victim, 
and the consequential loss following from that injury. The three elements may be allocated in 
the same state or in different states. In the latter case it is important that the places of acting, 
of injury and of the loss are clearly kept apart by precise language. Under the English (but 
also the French and German) version of the EC Draft Proposal, however, the distinction 
between the place of injury and the place where the loss is sustained remains unclear, 
however. The “country in which the loss is sustained” would appear to include the “country in 
which the indirect consequences of the harmful event are sustained” although only the former 
is material and the latter declared to be irrelevant by art. 3(1) DP. By introducing the concept 
of the place of injury, the alternative proposal of the Hamburg Group tries to separate this 
place from the place of consequential loss which is regarded as too accidental, open for 
manipulation and too difficult to determine as to serve as a connecting factor. 
3.  Strict liability. Apparently the EC Draft Proposal purports to cover both fault liability 
and non-fault or strict liability. This can be inferred from the fact that (not the country where 
the harmful act was committed, but) the “country ... in which the harmful event occurred” is 
declared to be irrelevant. By including quasi-delicts in accordance with art. 5 no. 3 
Reg. 44/200118, the Hamburg Group advocates a clarification of this meaning. 
4.  Ex ante-injunctions. As compared with art. 5 no. 3 of the Brussels Convention, art. 5 no. 
3 Reg. 44/2001 makes it clear that the court of the place where a tort or delict or quasi-delict 
occurred is not only competent for awarding damages and for ordering the termination of a 
wrong. The extension of the jurisdiction to cases in which a harmful event “may occur” 
indicates that art. 5 no. 3 Reg. 44/2001 also deals with preventive measures that enjoin the 
defendant from imminent wrongful action.19 As in that provision the formulation “may occur” 
requires that damage immediately threatens. Except for preliminary measures, such remedies 
should be based on the same national law as those which are applied for after the wrong has 
                                                          
18  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J.E.C. L 012, 
16/01/2001, 1-23. 
19  In accordance with art. 5 (3) Reg. 44/2001: “where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur”. 
23.09.02 12:55 13
occurred. Therefore the alternative proposal refers to the law of the state where the injury is or 
“may be” suffered.  
5.  General remarks on the escape clause, art. 3(3) DP. The Hamburg Group welcomes the 
introduction of an escape clause into the regulation. A mechanical application of lex loci 
delicti (art. 3(1) DP) or lex domicilii communis (art. 3(2) DP) may not be appropriate in each 
individual case. Although the EC Draft Proposal contains specific rules for some particular 
groups of cases (defamation, product liability, environmental torts), cases may arise in which 
these rules do not apply. It should also be noticed that the escape devices which are provided 
by the traditional conflicts law of the Member States such as characterization or renvoi can no 
longer be relied upon by national judges once the regulation is in force. Rather, under the 
Rome Convention or the Reg. 44/2001, characterization has to be carried out in an 
autonomous way, and renvoi is excluded (art. 19 DP). Therefore, judges urgently need a 
different device that enables them to reach fair and just results in the individual case at hand. 
Nevertheless, for reasons of legal security the regulation is and should be founded on a 
European rule-based understanding of the conflict of laws rather than on an American-
inspired "proper law approach".20 Flexibility in choosing the applicable law and foreseeability 
of results are the two goals one must strive to attain in a balanced fashion. 
6.  Accessory choice of law. The Hamburg Group also welcomes the introduction of 
accessory choice of law (art. 3(2) subpara. 2 DP). It is common knowledge that European 
legal systems draw the line between contractual and delictual obligations differently. While 
some countries allow the victim to base his or her claim simultaneously on a contractual as 
well as on a tortious (delictual) foundation (e.g. Germany), others deny this possibility (e.g. 
the principle of non-cumul in France). Moreover, contractual and delictual obligations are 
often interrelated. Gaps in one field are sometimes filled with instruments of the other legal 
area. For example, the “contract with protective effects for third parties” (Vertrag mit 
Schutzwirkung für Dritte) under German law, which is technically contractual in nature often 
fulfils social functions usually ascribed to tort law. Another example is the contractual basis 
of French and Austrian liability laws, which, at least from a comparative and functional point 
of view, are generally delictual in nature. Such differences lead to severe problems of 
characterization. Accessory choice of law, however, prevents these technical deviations from 
                                                          
20 See Jan Kropholler/Jan von Hein, From Approach to Rule-Orientation in American Tort 
Conflicts?, in: James A. R. Nafziger/Symeon Symeonides (eds.), Law and Justice in a 
Multistate World, Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren, Ardsley/New York 2002, 317–
340. 
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influencing the result of the case. Hence, it significantly increases legal security and 
predictability of results. 
7.  Special torts. Contrary to the approach pursued by the EC Draft Proposal, the Hamburg 
Group concludes that judges should also be able to invoke the escape clause in cases 
involving special torts regulated in arts. 5-8 DP such as product liability and defamation. In 
particular, product liability cases should not be exempt from an accessory choice of law (art. 
3(3) subpara. 2 DP). The general considerations supporting an accessory choice of law rule 
apply equally to cases where the injured person buys the defective goods directly from their 
manufacturer. In these cases, too, the enhancement of predictability and the reduction of 
conflicts between the law governing the contractual obligation of a party, on the one hand, 
and the law governing this party’s delictual obligations, on the other are objectives of primacy 
importance. With regard to environmental torts, however, accessory choice of law should be 
excluded because it would contradict the Hamburg Group’s negative attitude toward party 
autonomy in this area (see art. 11(1) of the Hamburg alternative proposal). Furthermore, in 
defamation cases, accessory choice of law will usually not be a viable solution because there 
is no pre-existing relationship between tortfeasor and victim. The general escape clause could 
come into play, however, if the particular circumstances of a defamation case deviate from the 
regular fact pattern in which the victim legitimately expects the protective standards of his or 
her country of habitual residence. The residence may have been set up solely for tax purposes 
in a country where there is no (or only insubstantial) distribution of the supposedly 
defamatory article (e.g. a German tennis player travelling around the world, but formally 
residing in Monaco, sues an Austrian tabloid for libel). Hence, judges should be enabled to 
rebut the presumption underlying art. 7 DP in cases where there is in fact no significant social 
connection of the victim with the country whose law would be applicable under that 
provision.  
8. Systematic relocation of the escape clause. For these reasons given under 7, the escape 
clause should be placed after the provisions related to particular torts or delicts. For the sake 
of systematic coherence, it should also encompass unjustified enrichment and negotiorum 
gestio. Therefore, the Hamburg Group suggests codifying the escape clause in a new art. 11a. 
See there for further comment. 
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Article 4 – Areas not subject to territorial sovereignty 
1.  The law applicable to a tort or delict 
occurring in areas not subject to the territorial 
sovereignty of a State shall be the law of the 
country in which the means of transport or the 
installation connected with the tort or delict is 
registered or whose flag it flies or with which 
it has similar connections.  
Replaced by new art. 11b 
2.  If there is no connection with a specific 
country or if there is a connection with several 
countries, the applicable law shall be that of 
the country with which the case is most 
closely connected. 
Replaced by new art. 11c 
C O M M E N T S 
The issues dealt with in art. 4 DP may arise in all types of non-contractual obligations and 
should be regulated by provisions of general purview, see below, arts. 11b and 11c of the 
Hamburg alternative proposal. 
Article 5 – Product liability 
1.  The law applicable to a non contractual 
obligation arising out of damage caused by a 
product shall be that of the country in which 
the person directly sustaining the loss is habi-
tually resident or has his main establishment, 
if that country is also the country where: 
-  the person alleged to be liable has his 
main establishment; or 
-  the product was purchased. 
1.  The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of damage caused by a 
product shall be that of the country in which 
the product was, or may be commercialised. 
The place of commercialisation is the place 
where the product is sold or let in another 
manner  to a final user for the first time. 
 
2.  In all other cases, the applicable law shall 
be that of the country where the tort or delict 
is committed. 
2.  If the country in which the person directly 
sustaining the loss is habitually resident or 
has his main establishment, is also the 
country where the person alleged to be liable 
has his main establishment, the applicable 
law shall be the law of that country. 
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C O M M E N T S 
1. Analysis. The main difference between art. 5 and art. 3 DP lies in the role of the place 
where the loss is sustained in determining the applicable law. Whereas this place constitutes 
the only relevant connecting factor in art. 3(1) DP, it is not to be taken into account in cases of 
product liability under art. 5(1) and (2) DP. Art. 5(1) first dash DP essentially repeats art. 3(2) 
DP, while art. 5(1) second dash and art. 5(2) DP each contain specific provisions. Also, in 
contrast to art. 3(3) DP, there is no escape clause. Consequently, a pre-existing contract 
between the parties that is linked to the tort or delict in question cannot be taken into account. 
Rules determining the applicable law to torts and delicts must, on the one hand, ensure that 
the person directly sustaining the loss gets adequate compensation and, on the other hand, 
give optimal incentives to the potential tortfeasor to prevent damage. This is also true in the 
special field of product liability. Here, these interests can be spelt out in a specific way. First, 
the applicable law should be predictable to the person alleged to be liable. Without any 
predictability the producer/importer will not be able to calculate the risk of the production and 
exportation of a product and, hence, to insure the risk. Second, the equal treatment of market 
participants must be ensured for reasons of competitive fairness. It shall be analysed whether 
the proposed art. 5 DP fulfils these functions. 
2. The basic rule: law of the country of commercialisation. In the case of product liability, 
the place where the loss is sustained can be purely accidental and unpredictable to both the 
producer/importer and the injured user. In the hypothetical case of a European tourist 
travelling through Indonesia where a bottle bought at home explodes, there is hardly any 
connection to the Indonesian law as the law of the place of injury. Consequently, the decision 
for a departure from the general rule in art. 3(1) DP and for a specific rule is the right solution. 
The critical evaluation has to start with art. 5(2) DP, since this paragraph, not paragraph 1, 
contains the basic conflict rule applicable to product liability. Therefore, the order of the two 
paragraphs should be changed. 
The wording of art. 5(2) DP is unclear. The country “where the tort or delict is committed” 
could be the place where the injury was suffered or the place of acting or both. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the place or places of acting is highly controversial in cases of product 
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liability. The place of production, of assemblage, of commercialisation at the first or any 
subsequent level of the distribution chain may each be arguably regarded or rejected as a 
place of acting. Consequently, the current draft proposal will provoke misunderstandings and 
different interpretations. Hence, it needs to be clarified. The Hamburg Group proposes that 
the connecting factor should be the place of commercialisation. The place of 
commercialisation is not the place where the producer puts the product into the chain of 
commerce (which will usually be at his production plant). Rather, it is the place where the 
product causing harm is sold or otherwise let to a final user for the first time. The application 
of this law provides for an equal treatment of all competitors on the respective market. And 
above all, the place of commercialisation is predictable to the producer/importer in most 
cases. S/he is usually able to organise his/her distribution network such as to determine the 
places of commercialisation. Using this criterion as a connecting factor would exclude the 
laws of countries in which certain goods are only sold as used goods. It would equally exclude 
the laws of countries that are not more than platforms in B2B commerce (business to business 
transactions). It would not, however, exclude the laws of those states whose markets are 
served by independent importers rather than the producer or the distributors of his own 
marketing network. 
Generally the legitimate expectations of a consumer regarding the law protecting his/her 
interests are guided by the place where s/he purchases, leases or rents the product. If the 
consumer is the first final user as defined above, the place of purchase, lease, rent and the like 
is equal to the place of commercialisation. Consequently the interests of this person are 
respected by applying the law of the country in which the product was commercialised. 
Through this application, he or she can regularly rely on the law of his/her home market. 
The situation of second purchasers or third parties is different. They have no necessary 
connection to the place of commercialisation. The application of the law of that country is 
nevertheless justified. The underlying aim is that the person directly sustaining the loss gets 
compensation. If the product is commercialised in a Member State of the European Union, a 
minimum compensation - even for third parties sustaining loss in a non-Member State - is 
ensured by the product liability Directive 85/37421.  
                                                          
21 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products, O.J.E.C. L 210 , 07/08/1985, 29 – 33. 
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The remaining cases are those where the product is commercialised outside the European 
Union. If the place of commercialisation is equal to the place of the habitual residence of the 
injured person or the main establishment of the person alleged to be liable there is a close 
connection to justify the application of the law of that country. This holds true in particular in 
cases where both connecting factors refer to that country. In all other cases the connecting 
factors point to different countries. Consequently a decision in favour of one connecting 
factor is necessary. It follows from what has been said that the law of the country in which the 
product is commercialised should prevail. 
3. The Exception. The Hamburg Group approves of the conflict rule contained in art. 5(1) 
first dash DP which in reality is an exception to the basic conflicts rule on product liability 
provided by art. 5(2) DP. 
The country where the person directly sustaining the loss is habitually resident is generally 
where s/he actually feels the loss. Thus, in most cases, there is a close connection to this 
country. Similarly, the main establishment of the person alleged to be liable is the place where 
the important decisions are taken. Its law is known or at least predictable to this person and 
usually influences his/her behaviour. Consequently, art. 5(1) first dash DP contains a justified 
solution that has been adopted by the Hamburg Group in paragraph 2 of its proposal. 
The exception contained in the second dash of art. 5(1) DP, however, appears less justified. 
This follows from the use and interpretation of the term “purchase”. This term includes sales 
of both new and used goods by private individuals (consumers). In these cases the country of 
purchase is unpredictable to the producer/importer. Hence, the aim of influencing his/her 
behaviour by the local product safety and liability rules cannot be reached. The 
producer/importer is only able to take into account the rules of the place of commercialisation. 
Whereas s/he may be able to survey his own distribution channels, there is no possibility of 
influence once the goods have been sold to the first final user. Hence, art. 5(1) second dash 
DP should be reconsidered. 
4. Escape clause. It does not seem that an escape clause would be necessary in many 
cases. But if such a situation appears before the judge, justice may be reached by the 
application of the general escape clause as proposed by the Hamburg Group (art. 11a).  
In order to avoid the problems arising out of the application of laws of different countries to 
contractual obligations on the one hand and product liability on the other hand, the same law 
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should be applicable to both contract law and product liability. Hence, a pre-existing contract 
between the parties that is linked to the tort or delict in question should be treated as an 
expression of a closer connection with another country justifying the application of the 
proposed general escape clause  (art. 11a).  
The escape clause may also be invoked with regard to claims of so-called bystanders, i.e. 
victims who have not themselves bought or otherwise acquired the defective product (e.g. a 
passenger in the buyer’s car which crashes due to a malfunction of its brakes, or a passer-by 
hit by the car spinning out of control). While the place of commercialisation may be regarded 
as an appropriate solution for a victim within the immediate social sphere of the buyer such as 
the passenger in the above-mentioned example, it is doubtful whether the rule contained in 
art. 5(1) of our alternative proposal is suitable for cases in which the victim had no relation to 
the buyer before the harmful event (e.g. the passer-by mentioned above). Applying the law of 
the place of commercialisation in such cases might be considered as an unfair surprise to the 
bystander, especially in light of the value judgment made in art. 3(1) DP to consider the 
protection of a victim’s legitimate expectations. Because appropriate solutions for these cases 
depend on a close analysis of very specific fact-patterns, it is suggested that this task should 
be left to judges who may apply art. 11a of the Hamburg alternative proposal. 
 
 
Article 6 – Unfair competition and other 
unfair practices 
Article 6 – Unfair and anticompetitive 
practices 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from unfair competition or 
other unfair practices shall be the law of the 
country where the unfair competition or other 
practice affects competitive relations or the 
collective interests of consumers. 
1.  The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from unfair competition or 
other unfair practices or a restraint of 
competition shall be the law of the country 
where the practice affects or may affect 
competitive relations or the collective 
interests of consumers. 
 2.  Where the elements relevant to the 
situation at the time of publication are 
exclusively connected with one or more 
Member States of the European Union and 
subject to article 7, non-contractual 
obligations arising from unfair advertising 
are governed by the law of the Member State 
where the advertising company has its 
principal place of business. 
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C O M M E N T S 
1.  Unfair competition and restraints of competition. The Hamburg Group approves of art. 
6 DP. It is essentially in line with the private international law of most Member States and 
also with the effects principle which the Court of Justice de facto espoused in its Wood Pulp 
decision concerning the scope of art. 81 EC.22 The overlap of the law against restrictions of 
competition and of the law against unfair competition favours the use of the same connecting 
factors. This would allow for extending art. 6 DP to non-contractual obligations arising out of 
restraints of competition. A clear-cut conflicts rule for such claims appears desirable in view 
of the intention of the European Commission to promote private enforcement of art. 81 and 
82 EC through national courts.23 An antecedent to and model for such a conflict rule is 
art. 137 of the Swiss statute on private international law.24 
A further amendment of the text (“or may affect”) again takes account of ex ante-injunctions 
and follows the wording of art. 5 no.3 Reg. 44/200125. 
2.  Intra-Community advertising. However, the Hamburg Group invites the Commission to 
consider an exception for intra-Community advertising. In this field, the harmonisation of 
substantive law is particularly far advanced. This is true for television advertising (Dir. 
89/55226 and 97/3627) and for commercial communications distributed via the internet (Dir. 
2000/3128). Other Community measures are applicable to advertising irrespective of the media 
                                                          
22  ECJ, judgment of 27 September 1988 (joined cases 89/85), Ahlström [1988] ECR V-5193. 
23  See the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No. 1017/68, 
(EEC) No. 2988/74, (EEC) No. 4056/86 and (EEC) No. 3975/87, EC Doc COM (2000) 582 
fin., section 2 C 1 (a) of the Explanatory Memorandum; cf. Jürgen Basedow, Who will 
Protect Competition in Europe? From central enforcement to authority networks and private 
litigation: EBOR 2 (2001) 443-468 at 459 seq.  
24 See supra, at n.6. 
25 See also supra, art. 3 comment no. 4. 
26 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the 
pursuit of television  broadcasting activities, O.J.E.C. L 298, 17/10/1989, 23 – 30. 
27 Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of  television 
broadcasting activities, O.J.E.C. L 202 , 30/07/1997, 60 – 70. 
28 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society  services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market  ('Directive on electronic commerce'), O.J.E.C. L 178, 17/07/2000, 1 – 
16. 
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used; this concerns the rules on misleading and comparative advertising (Dir. 84/45029 and 
97/5530), the advertising of medicinal products for human use (Dir. 92/2831), and various other 
measures which are contained in various Community acts. Insofar as substantive 
harmonisation has taken effect the country-of-origin principle will prevail over art. 6 DP for 
all practical purposes; this is due to art. 23 DP and the principles of the Internal Market which 
flow from primary Community law and take priority over conflicts rules adopted in 
instruments of secondary legislation. Thus, the target market as the point of contact set out in 
Art. 6 DP will in most intra-Community advertising cases be superseded by a different 
criterion implementing the country-of-origin rule. If the market principle, under the impact of 
the basic freedoms of Community law, de facto, looses its significance for advertising, the 
conflicts rule as such should be reconsidered. The complex two-tiered process shaped by the 
EC Draft Proposal and consisting of a choice of law and a Community law stage could be 
greatly simplified by drafting a specific conflicts rule for advertising along the lines of the 
Hamburg alternative proposal. In view of the far-reaching harmonisation of substantive law it 
would do little harm to consumers and competitors of advertising companies, while it would, 
on the other hand, allow Community-wide advertising to be based on a single legal system. 
This would favour the growth of an advertising industry operating at a Community scale.  
It follows from the systematical structure of art. 6 that para (2) if applicable, supersedes para 
(1). However, in case of advertising which also violates personality rights the specific rule in 
art. 7 DP prevails over art. 6 (2). 
 
 Article 6a – Infringement of Industrial and 
Intellectual Property Rights 
 1.  The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from an infringement of a 
copyright or a registered industrial property 
right shall be the law of the country for which 
protection is claimed. 
 2.  A non-contractual obligation arising 
from an infringement of a Community 
                                                          
29 Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading 
advertising,  O.J.E.C. L 250 , 19/09/1984, 17 – 20. 
30 Directive 97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending 
Directive 84/450/EEC concerning  misleading advertising so as to include comparative 
advertising, O.J.E.C. L 290, 23/10/1997, 18 – 23. 
31 Council Directive 92/28/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the advertising of medicinal products for 
human use, O.J.E.C. L 113, 30/04/1992, 13 –18. 
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industrial property right with a unitary 
character shall be governed by the law of the 
Member State where the infringement affects 
the right. 
C O M M E N T S 
The preliminary draft proposal neither contains a special conflict of laws rule for intellectual 
or industrial property infringements nor does it exclude copyrights, patents, trademarks and 
designs from its scope of application, see art. 1(2) DP. The Hamburg Group takes the view 
that the general conflicts rules contained in art. 3 of the EC Draft Proposal are not appropriate 
to address this matter and suggests the adoption of a special conflicts rule. 
1.  Industrial Property rights granted under national law. In all Member States and 
international conventions infringements of industrial property rights (patents, trademarks, 
designs, semiconductor products, plant variety rights) are governed by the lex loci protec-
tionis and not by the lex loci delicti. The lex loci protectionis is considered as a special rule 
for registered rights that supersedes the more general rules of private international law. 
National patents follow the principle of territoriality: a patent is granted as a monopolistic 
right for the territory of the granting State, but the monopoly ends at that state's boundaries. 
Therefore a German patent cannot be infringed by producing or distributing goods in France. 
This applies equally to all other registered national property rights like trademarks, designs, 
semiconductor products and plant variety rights. Ownership and infringement are a matter for 
legislation in the country where protection is claimed.  
International conventions on industrial property rights have affirmed the authority of the 
principle of territoriality. The Paris Union Convention for industrial property of 188332 is 
founded on the principle of national rights having a territorial scope. The Convention actually 
has 163 members including the EU Member States, the U.S., Japan, Russia and China. The 
European Patent Convention (EPC) of 197333 likewise subscribes to the principle of 
territoriality, and the European Patent Office grants bundles of national patents, art. 3 EPC. 
However, because these conventions do not state the principle of territoriality in explicit 
                                                          
32  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of  20 March 1883; RGBl.1903, 
147. 
33 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) of 5 October 
1973; BGBl. 1976 II, 649, 826.  
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words, the relevant provision on the conflict of conventions, art. 24 DP, is insufficient to 
ensure the acceptance of the world-wide system of national industrial property rights.  
Nor does art. 3 DP provide a suitable regulation for these registered rights. Art. 3(1) DP refers 
to the law of the country in which the loss is sustained. In contrast the lex loci protectionis 
refers to the law of the country in which the act of infringement was committed. While this 
tension might be accommodated by way of interpretation, art. 3(2) DP is incompatible with 
the basic principles governing industrial property rights. The application of the law of a 
country which has not granted the patent, trademark or other registered right cannot be 
justified. If an Italian resident infringes a French patent owned by another Italian national, 
French Patent Law has to be applied. If infringing goods are produced and/or distributed in 
several countries several laws are applicable, so long as patents are registered in these 
countries.  
2.  Unitary Community Industrial Property Rights. The lex loci protectionis is not 
sufficient and has to be supplemented with regard to Community trademarks, Community 
Designs, Community plant variety rights and similar rights which may be created in the 
future. 
Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trademark34 
provides for European property rights with a unitary character, and the territorial scope of the 
Community trademark extends to the Community as a whole. It has equal effect throughout 
the Community unless otherwise provided in the Regulation. For infringements of a 
Community trademark art. 98(1) grants peculiar injunctive relief, but in all other respects the 
Community trademark court shall apply the law of the Member State where “the acts of 
infringement or threatened infringement were committed, including the private international 
law”, art. 98(2). The reference to the private international law of the Member State should not 
be understood as mandating the application of the lex loci protectionis for each Member State. 
Because of the unitary character of the Community trademark, the locus protectionis is the 
Community. Since substantive Community provisions on the liability for infringement of a 
Community trademark are lacking, a supplementary conflicts rule referring the matter to the 
national law of a Member State is required. 
                                                          
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trademark, 
O.J.E.C. L 011, 14/01/1994, 1-36. 
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The Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs35 has 
created a similar situation regarding the choice of law rules for these Community industrial 
property rights. Under art. 89(1)(d) the Community design court shall make ”any order 
imposing other sanctions appropriate under the circumstances which are provided by the law 
of the Member State in which the acts of infringement or threatened infringement are 
committed, including its private international law.”   
In contrast, Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety 
rights36 itself provides for a substantive regulation of cease-and-desist orders and of damages, 
see art. 94. A reference to national law including private international law is made only in 
respect of claims for restitution in case of infringement of the right, see art. 97.  
It is submitted that the supplementary conflicts rule needed in these cases should refer to the 
law of the country or countries where the unitary Community right is affected. While this may 
lead to the application of several laws in case of multistate infringements, the application of 
each law is justified by the fact that the perpetrator of an infringement seeking the profit of his 
acts in a specific national market should bear the costs which arise from his acts under the 
laws of that country. 
3.  Intellectual Property (Copyright). Under the international private law of most Member 
States the infringement of copyrights including moral rights is subject to the lex loci 
protectionis. In addition, the Berne Convention of 188637 is founded on the same principle. 
With a view to the international acceptance of the lex loci protectionis for copyright 
infringements, a European harmonisation should not prescribe a different rule. 
The Berne Convention now has 149 contracting parties including the EU Member States, the 
U.S., Japan, Russia, China. Although the Berne Convention provides that a copyright is not a 
registered right but property flowing naturally and without formality from the act of creation, 
the Convention is built on the principle of territorial protection. It is founded on the idea that 
the extent of protection is governed by the law of the country where protection is claimed. 
Even though the principle is mentioned in explicit words in art. 5(2) and art. 14(2)(a) most 
                                                          
35 Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, O.J.E.C.  
    L 003, 05/01/2002, 1-24.  
36 Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights, 
O.J.E.C. L 227, 01/09/1994, 1-30. 
37 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of  9 September 1886,  
    RGBl. 1887, 493. 
23.09.02 12:55 25
authors believe that the convention itself does not state the principle of territoriality as a 
conflicts rule. Rather, they regard the territoriality of copyrights as a pre-existing rule for the 
Berne Convention. For that reason art. 24 DP, i.e. the provision on conflicts of conventions is 
insufficient to provide for the non-application of the general rules of the EC Draft Proposal.  
 
Article 7 – Defamation Article 7 – Violation of personality rights 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from a violation of private 
or personal rights or from defamation shall be 
the law of the country where the victim is 
habitually resident at the time of the tort or 
delict. 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from defamation or any 
other violation of private or personal rights 
shall be the law of the country where the 
victim is habitually resident at the time of the 
tort or delict. 
C O M M E N T S 
1.  Scope and title. While the EC Draft Proposal in accordance with its title would appear 
to cover only cases of defamation, the scope of the provision is much wider and includes the 
illegal interference with all kinds of personality rights such as the right of the individual to 
determine the use made of his/her own picture, personal data and genetic disposition. 
Defamation, generally defined as the violation of a person’s honour or reputation, is only one 
specific example of the infringement of personal rights. This explains the change of title and 
of the text (“defamation or any other...”) proposed by the Hamburg Group. 
2.  The conflicts rule. A conflicts rule dealing with defamation and other violations of 
personal rights such as the processing of personal data has to take into account two factual 
changes. First, the internet and international distribution of other media have turned this type 
of tort into a potentially ubiquitous behaviour. As a consequence, under art. 3(1) DP, the 
media industry could be exposed, in one and the same case, to a great number or – in the case 
of the internet – even to all laws. This explains the desire of the industry to reduce that 
exposure by advocating the law of the place of acting (production, publication) as the 
applicable law of this tort. It goes without saying that this solution would allow the media to 
shop around for the lowest standard of protection and would be very detrimental to victims in 
other countries. Second, victims are more mobile than they used to be and may be connected 
with many jurisdictions at the same time. This is true for multinational enterprises, but also 
for many individuals who acquire a worldwide reputation in the fields of politics, business, 
arts,  sports, science, or religion. If the general conflicts rule of art. 3(1) DP is to be 
understood such as to allow the victim of an internationally distributed defamation to invoke 
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the law of each country where his or her reputation has been impaired, a tremendous potential 
for forum shopping would be created.  
The Hamburg Group takes the view that art. 7 DP provides for a fair compromise between the 
divergent positions. The geographic centre of a victim's activities and interests is that person's 
habitual residence (“gewöhnlicher Auftenthalt” instead of “Wohnsitz” in the German version) 
or, in the case of a company, its central administration or principal place of business (see art. 
18 DP). It is safe to presume that this place is one voluntarily chosen by the individual or 
corporate victim. As a result, it is not unfair to exclude the laws of other countries where the 
victim’s reputation has been equally injured. Furthermore, a media undertaking which targets 
a foreign company or individual, can be expected to take into account the law of that person’s 
habitual residence (or central administration etc., art. 18 DP) where a defamatory statement 
would produce its main effects. This law is foreseeable and defines the target’s personal 
rights. The media's observation of this law is fair a trade-off for the exclusion of laws of other 
countries where the victim’s reputation is equally impaired. 
The Shevill opinion of the Court of Justice38 does not require a different solution. In that 
opinion the Court has acknowledged that a defamation claim, under art. 5 no. 3 Reg. 
44/200139, can be brought either in the country of publication – for recovery of the full loss – 
or, if limited to the loss occurred in the country of distribution, in that state. This opinion, 
however, dealt with the jurisdiction of the courts and, indirectly, with the application of the 
lex fori to procedural matters. But the Court’s decision has no implications for the applicable 
substantive law.  
In case of conflict with art. 6(2) as proposed by the Hamburg Group art. 7 DP is to prevail. 
Art. 8 – Violation of the environment 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from a violation of the 
environment shall be the law of the country in 
whose territory the damage occurs or 
threatens to occur.  
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from a violation of the 
environment shall be the law of the country in 
whose territory the injury is or may be 
suffered. 
                                                          
38  ECJ, judgment of 7 March 1995 (Case C-68/93), Shevill v. Presse Alliance S.A. [1995] ECR 
I-415; NJW 1995, 1882; IPrax 1996, 111. 
39  See supra, at n. 12. 
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C O M M E N T S 
At first sight, art. 8 DP does not seem to deviate from art. 3(1) DP and might appear as 
superfluous. The reason for an independent conflicts rule on the violation of the environment 
emerges from the absence, in art. 8 DP, of exceptions similar to those laid down in art. 3(2) 
and (3) DP. In fact, art. 8 DP is not qualified, neither in a general sense, art. 3(3) DP, nor in 
case both parties are habitually resident in the same state, art. 3(2) DP. The strong territorial 
roots of the environment effectively reduce the weight to be given to personal points of 
contact such as the habitual residence of landowners etc. It is therefore appropriate to provide 
for a specific conflicts rule on environmental liability excluding such personal points of 
contact. On the other hand, the need for a general escape clause cannot be excluded 
altogether. While it will be used with circumspection in this field, it should nevertheless be 
available, see art. 11a of the Hamburg alternative proposal. 
The changes proposed by the Hamburg Group in respect of art. 8 DP essentially concern the 
drafting and not the substance of the provision. By replacing “injury” with “damage” the 
Group – just like in art. 3(1) DP – seeks to clarify that the country where damage is sustained 
in terms of financial or other consequential losses, e.g. the country where the owner of 
contaminated land has his/her bank account or habitual residence, is irrelevant. Rather, what 
counts is the place where the soil is polluted. In case of natural resources which are not 
confined to a given territory such as water, air, fish or game, the place of injury includes all 
countries which are affected by the pollution in the regular course of affairs.  
Furthermore, the wording (“or may be suffered”) has again been adapted to art. 5 no. 3 Reg. 
44/2001 (see also above, at art. 3 comment no. 4). 
The Group has also discussed the question whether in case of environmental torts affecting 
several states a single law should be identified as applicable. This would most likely be the 
law of the country where the cause of pollution was released. But the Group does not find this 
solution to be acceptable. It is difficult to see how judges of Member States could, in a case 
such as the Chernobyl disaster, be obliged to exclusively apply the law of a non-member 
State. Moreover, such a rule would encourage industry to lobby even more for limitations of 
liability in their home countries, and it would induce defendants to invoke the multistate rule 
in order to avoid liability under a foreign law. The end result might even create an incentive 
for injuring the environment in several states instead of one. 
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Article 9 – Scope of the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations arising out of a 
tort or delict 
Article 9 – Scope of the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations arising out of a 
tort, delict or quasi-delict 
The law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations under Articles 3 to 8 and 11 of 
this Regulation shall govern: 
The law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations under Articles 3 to 8 and 11 to 11c 
of this Regulation shall govern: 
1.  the basis, conditions and extent of 
liability, including the determination of 
persons who are liable for acts performed by 
them; 
1.  the basis, conditions and extent of 
liability, including the determination of 
persons who are liable for acts performed by 
them, and tortious capacity; 
2.  the grounds for exemption from liability , 
any limitation of liability and any division of 
liability; 
 
2. the grounds for exemption from liability, 
any limitation or division of liability 
including contributory negligence; 
 
3.  the existence and kinds of injury or 
damage for which compensation may be due; 
 
3.  No changes 
 
4.  the measures which a court has power to 
take under its procedural law to prevent or 
terminate injury or damage or to ensure the 
provision of compensation; 
 
4.  the measures which a court has 
jurisdiction to grant under its procedural law 
to prevent or terminate injury or damage or to 
ensure the provision of compensation; 
 
5.  the measure of damages in so far as 
prescribed by law; 
 
5.  No changes 
 
6.  the question whether a right to 
compensation may be assigned or inherited; 
 
6.  No changes 
 
7.  persons entitled to compensation for 
damage sustained personally; 
 
7.  No changes 
 
8.  liability for the acts of another person, 
 
8.  No changes 
 
 9.  performance and the various ways of 
extinguishing the obligation; 
 
9.  the rules of prescription and limitation, 
including rules relating to the commencement 
of a period of prescription or limitation and 
the interruption and suspension of the period. 
10. No changes as compared to no. 9 DP 
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C O M M E N T S 
1. General. Art. 9 DP obviously draws a welcome parallel to art. 10 of the Rome 
Convention. It is extremely helpful for practitioners to see expressly listed the matters which 
fall within the ambit of the proper law of the tort or delict. Matters of characterization could 
otherwise become a major problem and a major source for misunderstandings. 
2. Amendments. Only a few minor amendments are proposed: Firstly, in order to avoid 
conflicts of characterization it appears sensible to expressly include tortious capacity in no. 1. 
Otherwise, it would be possible to characterize tortious capacity as a matter left to the general 
rules on capacity and thus generally governed by the law of the tortfeasor’s domicile, habitual 
residence or nationality. The express inclusion would be an expression of the more general 
rule that special capacities relating to certain acts are governed by the proper law of that 
relationship. Secondly, contributory negligence deserves an express mention in no. 2. 
Contributory negligence is certainly the most important reason for a division of liability. 
However, to refer only to the "division of liability" might be misinterpreted by a court without 
knowledge of these specific concepts. Mentioning contributory negligence clarifies the 
wording and answers an important question at first glance. Thirdly, the proposed change in 
the wording of no. 4 is simply a matter of editing and updating the wording consistent with 
the standard of terminology used in procedural law. Fourthly, the proposed new no. 9 is a 
sibling to art. 10(1)(d) of the Rome Convention. It should go without saying that the 
performance of an obligation is governed by the proper law of that obligation, but it does no 
harm to expressly add some words on performance and its substitutes. Otherwise there could 
arise the danger of an argumentum e contrario derived from a comparison to art. 10(1)(d) of 
the Rome Convention. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
OUT OF AN ACT  
OTHER THAN A TORT 
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
OUT OF AN ACT  
OTHER THAN A TORT, DELICT OR 
QUASI-DELICT 
 
Article 10 - Determination of the applicable 
law 
Article 10 – Unjust enrichment 
1.  If a non-contractual obligation arising out 
of an act other than a tort or delict concerns a 
relationship previously existing between the 
parties, it shall be governed by the law of the 
country whose law governs that relationship. 
1. If a non-contractual obligation arising out 
of unjust enrichment concerns a relationship 
previously existing, or supposed to be 
existing, between the parties, it shall be 
governed by the law of the country whose law 
governs that relationship. 
 
 2. A non-contractual obligation arising from 
a non-tortious infringement of a protected 
interest or right shall be governed by the law 
of the country which grants such protection or 
for which such protection is claimed. A non-
contractual obligation arising from a non-
tortious infringement of a Community 
industrial property right with a unitary 
character shall be governed by the law of the 
Member State where the infringement affects 
the right. 
 
2.  Subject to paragraph 1, a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of unjust enrichment 
shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the enrichment takes place. 
3. In any other event, a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of unjust enrichment 
shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the enrichment takes place. 
 
3. Subject to paragraph 1, a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of actions performed 
without due authority in connection with the 
affairs of another person shall be governed by 
the law of the country in which the action 
takes place. 
Replaced by new art. 10b(1) 
4.  Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 and 
subject to paragraph 1, if the parties have their 
4. Subject to paragraph 1, if the parties have 
their habitual residence in the same country 
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habitual residence in the same country when 
the non-contractual obligation arises, the 
obligation shall be governed by the law of that 
country. 
when the non-contractual obligation arises, 
the obligation shall be governed by the law of 
that country. 
  
 Art. 10a – Scope of the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations arising out of 
unjust enrichment 
 
The law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations arising out of unjust enrichment 
shall govern: 
1. the basis and conditions of any such 
obligation, including the determination of 
creditor and debtor; 
2. the objections to, and exemptions from, any 
such obligation; 
3. the extent of liability under such obligation 
including any privilege, exclusion, division or 
restriction and the question whether 
restitution in kind or money is due; 
4. the question whether the liability might be 
extended upon third parties; 
5. the question whether such obligation may 
be assigned or inherited; 
6. performance and the various ways of 
extinguishing the obligation; 
7. the rules of prescription and limitation, 
including rules relating to the commencement 
of a period of prescription or limitation and 
the interruption and suspension of the period;
8. accompanying tracing claims. 
  
 
[Article 10(3) DP: 
Subject to paragraph 1, a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of actions performed 
without due authority in connection with the 
affairs of another person shall be governed by 
the law of the country in which the action 
takes place.] 
Article 10 b – Negotiorum gestio 
1. Subject to paragraph 2, a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of acts concerning 
another person’s affairs and performed 
without due authority (negotiorum gestio), 
shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the relevant acts take place. 
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 2. If a person performs another person’s 
obligations without due authority, the mutual 
claims between the acting person (the gestor) 
and that other person shall be governed by 
the law that governed the original obligation 
fulfilled. 
[Article 10(4) DP: 
Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 and 
subject to paragraph 1, if the parties have their 
habitual residence in the same country when 
the non-contractual obligation arises, the 
obligation shall be governed by the law of that 
country.] 
3. Subject to paragraph 2, if the parties have 
their habitual residence in the same country 
when the non-contractual obligation arises, 
the obligation shall be governed by the law of 
that country. 
  
 Art. 10c – Scope of the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations arising out of 
negotiorum gestio 
The law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations arising out of negotiorum gestio 
shall govern: 
1. the basis and conditions of any such 
obligation, including the determination of 
creditor and debtor; 
2. the extent of liability under such obligation 
including any privilege, exclusion, division or 
restriction; 
3. the mutual collateral obligations of the 
parties including claims against the gestor, 
and the question whether or to which extent 
the gestor may be entitled to an advance 
payment; 
4. the standard of care to be observed by the 
gestor; 
5. the question whether such obligation may 
be assigned or inherited; 
6. performance and the various ways of 
extinguishing the obligation; 
7. the rules of prescription and limitation, 
including rules relating to the commencement 
of a period of prescription or limitation and 
the interruption and suspension of the period. 
 
23.09.02 12:55 33
 
C O M M E N T S   O N   A R T I C L ES 10 – 10c 
 
1. Structure of the chapter. Chapter 2 should be restructured substantially. In its present 
form it does not accurately reflect the state of the law and is underrepresented compared to the 
detailed structure of Chapter 1 on torts and delicts. To confine the chapter to basically a single 
rule each on the law applicable to unjust enrichment and negotiorum gestio pays too little 
justice to some differentiation that already took place in modern conflicts law. This is 
reflected by the addition of the proposed paragraphs 2 of arts. 10 and 10b respectively. The 
new art. 10(2) in addition clarifies the line drawn by art. 10(2) DP, in order to keep in line 
with art. 3(1). The proper law of a claim in tort and the proper law of a competing claim in 
restitution should run parallel to avoid conflicts of characterization. This is particularly 
reflected in the second sentence of art. 10(2) of the Hamburg alternative proposal mirroring 
and complementing art. 6a(2) of the Hamburg alternative proposal. 
2. Restitution related to contracts. There must be a specific rule like art. 10(1) DP for 
restitution after the collapse of a contract; on the one hand this is a bare necessity and on the 
other hand a prerequisite already set by art. 10(1)(e) of the Rome Convention. A slight 
refinement in the wording, namely the addition of a phrase expressly referring to a 
relationship only supposed to be existing, does not result in an alteration in substance, but 
serves as a means of clarification to expressly include void contracts (which might be deemed 
akin to non-existing contracts). Additionally, this provides a clear-cut solution in the event 
that a person performs a non-existing obligation under the erroneous assumption that this 
obligation exists. 
3. Other cases of restitution. Art. 10(1) and (2) DP already acknowledge that the case of 
performance of obligations under a (supposed) relationship and the case of an infringement of 
rights or interests (akin to tortious liability) ought to be treated differently. The necessary 
differentiation also results in an attempted rule dealing with all other kinds of restitution, 
particularly restitutionary redress. The proposed art. 10(3) is a catch-all clause for rather 
uncommon and rare cases. It repeats the wording of art. 10(2) DP but its relevance is reduced 
by the introduction of the new and more confined art. 10(2). 
4. Negotiorum gestio. To include a conflicts rule for negotiorum gestio is undoubtedly a 
bold attempt since this concept or notion is almost unheard of in some Member States. Where 
such a concept exists, national laws might differ in scope. Nevertheless, for convincing 
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reasons of systematic coherence and comprehensiveness the future Regulation should contain 
a conflicts rule for negotiorum gestio. No one can deny the very existence of the respective 
situations and, as a result, they should get proper attention. This has the advantage to start 
relatively afresh and one should not be afraid of defining the notion as art. 10(2) DP 
demonstrates. In addition, it appears useful to introduce at least the gestor as another terminus 
technicus by way of definition. Admittedly transborder cases involving negotiorum gestio 
have been rare in the past and might be rarae aves in the future too. Nevertheless, art. 10b(2) 
of the Hamburg alternative proposal is a specific rule for the event that negotiorum gestio can 
be instrumentalized as a means of redress. 
5. Salvage. The most commonly discussed case of negotiorum gestio in the conflict of 
laws was the case of a ship rendering help to another ship. Nevertheless it is not advisable to 
design a rule especially for this case. In modern times such cases mostly fall into the realm of 
contract and are not left to negotiorum gestio.40 The small remainder not ruled by contract 
will most likely be governed by the Convention on Salvage.41  It appears even more 
unnecessary to provide for a specific conflicts rule since there would be a kind of deadlock to 
choose between the flag of the helping ship and the flag of the ship to which help is rendered, 
as the appropriate connecting factor.42 
6. Common habitual residence. The Hamburg Group appreciates art. 10(4) DP. Evaluating 
the common habitual residence in the same country as a prevailing connecting factor is in line 
with art. 3(2) of both DP and our proposal and art. 5(2) of our proposal. It also provides a very 
sensible opportunity for applying lex propria in foro proprio since in the cases concerned, 
lawsuits will almost invariably be filed with the courts of the country in which both parties 
live. Nevertheless, as acknowledged by art. 10(4) DP there must be exceptions to the rule. 
With regard to unjust enrichment, regard must once again be had to art. 10(1)(e) of the Rome 
Convention, and consequently an exception has to be made for the cases falling under art. 
10(1) DP. As to negotiorum gestio, art. 10b(2) of the Hamburg alternative proposal has to be 
viewed in its context as only one method of redress between persons other than the creditor 
and debtor of an original obligation, i.e. persons which might habitually resident in a country 
                                                          
40  For the determination of the proper law of a salvage contract under the Rome Convention cf. 
Peter Mankowski, Seerechtliche Vertragsverhaeltnisse im Internationalen Privatrecht, 
Tuebingen 1995, 444-447. 
41  International Convention on Salvage, given at London on April 28, 1989; in force as of July 
14, 1996; text e.g. in Uniform Law Review 1989 I, at 218 et seq. 
42  Bernd von Hoffmann, in: von Staudinger, BGB, Articles 38-42 EGBGB, 14th ed. Berlin 
2001, Art. 39 EGBGB note 33 with ample references. 
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different from that whose law governs the original obligation. Thus, in order to gain maximal 
conflictual harmony and maintain minimal friction between the various methods of redress 
the rule set out in art. 10(4) DP should not apply. However, where appropriate to reach the 
mentioned aim, the general escape clause in art. 11a of the Hamburg alternative proposal (art. 
3(3) DP) might provide suitable means of deviation, and prevent art. 10b(2) from becoming 
too rigid. 
 
7. Scope of the applicable law. Chapter 2 was out of balance compared to chapter 1 insofar 
as it did not contain any rule like art. 9 DP, i.e. a rule on characterization that qualifies certain 
matters as being within the ambit of the proper law of the unjust enrichment or the 
negotiorum gestio. This lacuna might be filled by the proposed arts. 10a and 10c respectively. 
The proposed wording seeks to establish parallels to art. 9 DP as far as possible. However, the 
existing differences appear to make it inappropriate to establish a general rule on 
characterization. For instance, art. 10a no. 4 of the Hamburg alternative proposal has no 
parallel in the law of torts, and the aspects mentioned in our art. 10c nos. 3 and 4 are germane 
to the law of negotiorum gestio (and form a very considerable part of its entire system since 
those questions regulate the incentives to the gestor). Art. 10c no. 3 avoids the possibility of 
having to apply two different laws43 to mutual claims. This alternative is not feasible for it 
destroys conflictual harmony between a claim and a counter-claim.44 To expressly subject 
accompanying and auxiliary tracing claims to the law governing the main claim in restitution 
is advocated by art. 10a no. 9 of our proposal. Generally, auxiliary claims should follow the 
main claims that they are aimed to support and effectivate. Art. 10(1) of the Rome 
Convention, which appears to be the discernible model for art. 9 DP and consequently our 
proposed arts. 10a and 10c, has proved extremely useful in this context. The more detailed the 
catalogue of matters the easier lawyers and courts can answer questions by simply reading the 
text of the Regulation. Some redundancy by repeating words already to be found in art. 9 DP 
with regard to torts is not too high a price for accomplishing that feat. 
8. Triangular situations. Like the EC Draft Proposal the present proposal refrains from 
adding a specific rule for triangular situations, which could be the worst nightmare of the law 
                                                          
43 As sometimes was advocated in the past; cf. for possible reasons Ernst Rabel/Ulrich Drobnig, 
The Conflict of Laws, Vol. III, 2nd ed. Ann Arbor, Mich. 1964,  194. 
44 Cf. only Oberlandesgericht Koblenz June 20, 1991, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1992, 
2367; Bernd von Hoffmann, in: von Staudinger, BGB, Articles 38-42 EGBGB, 14th ed. 
Berlin 2001, Art. 39 EGBGB note 62. 
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of unjust enrichment in substantive law. The possible situations are so diverse and manifold45 
that any attempt to draft rules covering them at least in their majority, is doomed for failure. 
Art. 10(1) in fine must not be understood as a conclusive answer as might be easily illustrated 
by a typical case of triangular situations where two possible claims in restitution lead to two 
different debtors and are governed by two different laws. However, art. 10(3) as a catch-all 
clause for rather uncommon and rare cases and thus as a kind of ultima ratio should govern 
any restitutionary relationship that cannot be brought under art. 10(1) and (2). 
 
 
                                                          
45 Cf. e.g. Bernd von Hoffmann, in: von Staudinger, BGB, Articles 38-42 EGBGB, 14th ed. 
Berlin 2001, Art. 38 EGBGB notes 18-27. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMMON RULES APPLICABLE TO 
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS  
ARISING OUT OF A TORT OR DELICT 
AND THOSE ARISING OUT OF AN ACT 
OTHER THAN A TORT OR DELICT 
COMMON RULES APPLICABLE TO 
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS  
ARISING OUT OF A TORT, DELICT OR 
QUASI-DELICT 
AND THOSE ARISING OUT OF AN ACT 
OTHER THAN A TORT, DELICT OR 
QUASI-DELICT 
 
Article 11 - Freedom of choice 
1.  The parties may choose the law 
applicable to a non-contractual obligation. 
The choice shall be made expressly and shall 
not adversely affect the rights of third parties. 
1.  Except for the cases covered by articles 
6, 6a and 8, the parties may choose the law 
applicable to a non-contractual obligation. 
The choice shall be made expressly and shall 
not adversely affect the rights of third parties. 
2.  If all the other elements of the situation at 
the time when the obligation arises are located 
in a country other than that whose law has 
been chosen, the choice of the parties shall 
not prejudice the application of rules of the 
law of that country which cannot be derogated 
from (“mandatory rules”).  
2.  If all the other elements of the situation at 
the time when the obligation arises are located 
in a country other than that whose law has 
been chosen, the choice of the parties shall 
not prejudice the application of rules of the 
law of that country which cannot be derogated 
from (“internally mandatory rules”). 
3.  The choice of the parties of the applicable 
law shall not debar the application of 
mandatory provisions of Community law 
where the other elements of the situation were 
located in one of the Member States of the 
European Community at the time when the 
obligation came into being. 
3.  The choice of the parties of the applicable 
law shall not debar the application of 
mandatory provisions of Community law 
where the other elements of the situation were 
located in one or more of the Member States 
of the European Community at the time when 
the obligation came into being. The 
mandatory provisions of Community law shall 
be applied such as implemented in the law of 
the Member State which would be applicable 
in the absence of a choice. 
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C O M M E N T S 
1. Admissibility of the choice of law. The Hamburg Group basically approves of the 
admission of the free choice of law with regard to non-contractual obligations. However, the 
parties’ choice should be without effect where public interests are or may be involved. This 
concerns competition law, which always aims at the protection of certain markets, not only in 
the interest of the market actors, but also with a view to the public good. Similar consider-
ations apply to the infringement of industrial and intellectual property rights due to their 
territorial scope and to the protection of the environment which usually pursues some public 
interests beyond the protection of the landowners who are directly affected.  
While GEDIP had proposed to admit the free choice of the applicable law only subsequent to 
the events that give rise to non-contractual liability, the EC Draft Proposal does not contain a 
similar restriction. In our view, that restriction is not indispensable. While, there may be 
ethical objections to a choice of law antecedent to a non-consensual infringement of a victim's 
rights such a choice prior to the harmful event can only be conceived in cases where a 
contractual relationship between the parties already exists at the time of the tort or delict or 
quasi-delict. Art. 3(1) of the Rome Convention guarantees the free choice of law for that 
contractual relationship. Moreover, the synchronization of the choice of law for contractual 
and non-contractual obligations arising from the same fact-pattern appears highly desirable in 
view of the coordination that single legal systems provide with regard to the conditions and 
extent of liability, and the remedies granted. It is therefore very likely that the escape clause 
of art. 3(3) subpara. 2 DP (art. 11a(2) of the Hamburg alternative proposal) would be used to 
apply the law chosen by the parties for their contractual relationship to any non-contractual 
obligation. For all practical effects, this amounts to the admission of the choice of law 
antecedent to the harmful event with regard to non-contractual obligations.  
2. The reservation of mandatory rules. Art. 11(2) DP corresponds to art. 3(3) of the Rome 
Convention. For the practical application of that convention two different concepts of 
mandatory rules are useful: The internally mandatory rules of a state which may not be 
derogated from in cases without any transboundary element, but which may be ousted by a 
choice of a foreign law where the fact situation has some contact with a foreign country. The 
second group of mandatory provisions are the internationally mandatory rules dealt with in 
art. 12 DP and art. 7 of the Rome Convention; they are regarded as so important for the legal 
system of a state as not even to give way to the choice of a foreign law in transborder cases. 
This distinction should be clarified by appropriate terminology.  
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The Hamburg Group welcomes art. 11(3) DP. It will fill a gap that had been left open by art. 3 
of the Rome Convention with regard to contractual obligations. In intra-Community cases, the 
mandatory provision enacted by the Community should in fact be treated like internally 
mandatory rules in art. 11(2) DP. Consequently, the choice of the law of a non-member state 
should not thwart the implementation of the mandatory Community provisions where all 
relevant elements of the situation are located within the Community, either in one or in more 
Member States. Unlike the French and the German versions of the draft proposal, however, 
the English text does not cover the case of an intra-Community, transborder fact situation. 
Such a situation, from a Community point of view, the same characteristics as a fact pattern 
which is linked to one Member State exclusively; hence the added words “or more” in the 
Hamburg alternative proposal.  
The mandatory provisions of Community law may be regulations or directives. In the latter 
case, the courts have to apply, not the directive, but the national provisions adopted for its 
implementation in national law. But which national law? Should the judge enforce the lex fori 
or the law of the Member State that would be applicable without the choice of law? The latter 
solution would appear to be in line with the basic approach of the EC Draft Proposal and 
should therefore be added to the text. 
The Hamburg Group would also like to point out that the reservation in favour of mandatory 
rules under art. 11(2) and (3) DP should not be confined to cases where the choice of law 
explicitly refers to non-contractual obligations, but also where a choice relating to contractual 
obligations results in a subordinate or synchronized application of the same law to the non-
contractual obligations under art. 3(3) subpara. 2 DP (art. 11a(2) of the Hamburg alternative 
proposal). 
[Art. 3(3) DP 
However, if it appears from the circumstances 
as a whole that there is a substantially closer 
connection with another country and there is 
no significant connection between the non-
contractual obligation and the country whose 
law would be the applicable law under 
paragraphs 1 and 2, the law of that other 
country shall be applicable. 
Article 11 a – Escape clause 
1. If it appears from all the circumstances of 
an exceptional case that the non-contractual 
obligation is substantially closer connected 
with another country than with the country 
whose law would be applicable under the 
regular rules, the law of that other country 
shall be applicable. 
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A substantially closer connection with another 
country may be based in particular on a pre-
existing relationship between the parties, such 
as a contract that is linked to the tort or delict 
in question.] 
2. A substantially closer connection with 
another country may be based in particular on 
a contract or another pre-existing relationship 
between the parties, provided that they could 
have chosen the applicable law for this type of 
non-contractual obligation under article 11. 
C O M M E N T S 
1. Problems involved in the current two-pronged approach. The current art. 3(3) DP opts 
for a two-pronged exception clause that is reminiscent of art. 10(2) of the 1972 EEC draft46. 
This provision read as follows: 
"However, if, on the one hand, there is no significant link between the situation arising from 
the event which has resulted in damage or injury and the country in which that event occurred 
and, on the other hand, the situation has a closer connexion with another country, then the law 
of that other country shall apply." 
Under art. 3(3) DP, two conditions have to be met simultaneously if the general rule is to be 
displaced: 
(1) It must appear from the circumstances as a whole that there is a substantially closer 
connection with another country, 
and 
(2) there must be no significant connection between the non-contractual obligation and the 
country whose law would be the applicable law under paragraphs 1 and 2. 
 
This two-pronged approach is problematic, because it combines a relative standard ("closer 
connection") with an absolute one ("no significant connection"). Escape clauses in national 
codifications usually presuppose that a comparison has to be made between the proximity of a 
given case to the state whose law would be applicable under the general rule(s) and the 
connection of the case with another country. See, e.g., § 48(1) 2nd sentence of the Austrian 
IPRG47, art. 41(1) of the German EGBGB48 and the very explicit s. 12 of the British PIL (MP) 
Act 199549, which mandates a "comparison of – (a) the significance of the factors which 
connect a tort or delict with the country whose law would be the applicable law under the 
                                                          
46 See supra, at n.2. 
47 Bundesgesetz vom 15.6.1978 über das internationale Privatrecht, IPRG, BGBl. No. 304/1978. 
48 See supra, at n. 4. 
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general rule; and (b) the significance of any factors connecting the tort or delict with another 
country". Since the escape clause in art. 3(3) DP can only be invoked if there is "no 
significant connection between the non-contractual obligation and the country whose law 
would be the applicable law under paragraphs 1 and 2", it is difficult to see how the judge 
should compare the closeness of the connection between the non-contractual relationship and 
the country designed by the general rule with the closeness of the connection between the 
tortious relationship and another country. Under the narrow wording of art. 3(3) DP, it would 
not suffice if the judge considered the connection between the case at hand and the country 
designed by the general rules as clearly less significant than the connection between the case 
and another country. Only if there is no significant relationship between the case and the 
country whose law would normally be applicable, could he or she depart from the general 
rules contained in art. 3(1) and (2) DP. The open question is how connecting factors which 
support the general conflicts rules of art. 3(1) and (2) DP (place of the harmful event, 
common habitual residence) and which are therefore deemed to have some significance could 
ever be regarded not only as comparatively less significant, but rather simply as insignificant. 
In the light of this absolute standard, it is also difficult to see how the judge should handle the 
first branch of art. 3(3) DP. A connection with another country can only be deemed 
"substantially closer" if we know by which yardstick we have to measure this closeness. For 
example, A can be closer to B than to C, but A cannot be just "closer" without further 
information concerning the decisive question: closer compared to what? The obvious point of 
reference would be the country whose law would be applicable under art. 3(1) and (2) DP (the 
"regular country"). But even if this comparison leads the judge to consider the connection 
between the case and another country as substantially closer than that between the case and 
the "regular country", this exercise would still lead him or her nowhere because of the 
following absolute barrier ("no significant relationship").  
In the face of this conundrum, judges have two options: First, they may opt for a literal 
application of Art. 3(3) DP realizing that the requirement of the second branch („no 
significant relationship“) can never be met, and thereby depriving the escape clause of any 
practical value. Second, they may apply the European escape clause just like they have 
applied their national escape clauses, i.e. comparing the two relevant countries' competing 
connections with the case at hand and then deciding which connection is more or less 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
49 See supra, at n. 7. 
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significant (see s. 12 (1) of the British PIL (MP) Act 1995). This would be the only sensible 
approach, but hardly in line with the restrictive wording of the second branch of art. 3(3) DP.  
2. Alternative proposal. The second branch of art. 3(3) of the current draft seems to be 
motivated by the desire to prevent judges from being overly generous in departing from the 
general conflicts rules. This policy is sound, yet it should be pursued by other and less clumsy 
means. 
a)  No “cherry-picking”. First of all, it makes sense to remind the judge that he or she has, 
in weighing the significance of the various connections, to take into account "the 
circumstances as a whole" (art. 3(3) of the current draft). This is well-established in several 
national codifications, see explicitly s. 12 of the British PIL (MP) Act ("in all the 
circumstances"), art. 3257 Louisiana Civil Code50 ("totality of the circumstances"), art. 3082 
Code civil québecois51 ("compte tenu de l'ensemble de circonstances"). This prevents judges 
from focussing on one single connecting factor just to satisfy their homing instincts ("cherry-
picking"). 
b) Warning sign. Secondly, it is helpful to put up a warning sign that alerts judges to the 
fact that, by invoking an escape clause, they are departing from the main road and entering 
uncharted territory. The exceptional nature of escape clauses is highlighted in national laws 
by formulations such as a "significantly closer connection" (art. 41(1) German EGBGB), 
"substantially more appropriate" (s. 12(1) British PIL (MP) Act), "clearly evident" in an 
"exceptional case" (art. 3257 Louisiana Civil Code), "à titre exceptionnel ... manifeste" (art. 
3082 Code civil québecois). 
3. Interpretation by Court of Justice. Finally legislators who decide to insert an escape 
clause into a codification of P.I.L. make clear that they trust the judges who are to apply the 
law to do so in a methodologically correct and responsible way. Unfortunately, it is common 
knowledge that judges are all too often experts in substantive law, but significantly less 
competent in the conflict of laws. The solution to this problem lies not, however, in 
formulating verbose and clumsy conflicts provisions or setting up "laundry lists" of potential 
connecting factors (such as s. 12(3) of the British PIL (MP) Act, § 6(2) of the Rest. 2d or art. 
3542 of the Louisiana Civil Code). The Member States should rather ensure that international 
cases are decided by well-qualified judges who have sufficient and specific legal knowledge 
                                                          
50  Louisiana Civil Code, Act No. 923 of 1991, H.B. 251 = RabelsZ 57 (1993) 508. 
51  Code civil du 18.12.1991, L.Q. 1991, ch. 64 = RabelsZ 60 (1996) 327. 
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and experience for this task. Moreover, the reference procedure under art. 234 EC could help 
to attain that objective. Given the limitations introduced by art. 68 EC one might consider a 
unanimous Council decision under art. 67(2) EC to restore the right of inferior national courts 
to refer cases to the Court of Justice for the purposes of the future Regulation. 
4. Accessory choice of law.52 The proposed changes are mostly technical in nature and 
reflect the relocation of the escape clause in a new art. 11a. The sentence “if the parties could 
have chosen the applicable law for this type of tort or delict” is necessary for the sake of 
logical coherence with the restrictions proposed in art. 11(1) of the Hamburg alternative 
proposal. 
 
[Article 4(1) DP 
 
 
The law applicable to a tort or delict occurring 
in areas not subject to the territorial 
sovereignty of a State shall be the law of the 
country in which the means of transport or the 
installation connected with the tort or delict is 
registered or whose flag it flies or with which 
it has similar connections.] 
Article 11b  – Acts in areas not subject to 
territorial sovereignty  
 
1. Subject to Article 11a, the law applicable to 
a non-contractual obligation arising from 
acts occurring aboard a ship on the High 
Seas or a flying aircraft shall be the law of 
the country the flag of which the ship is 
entitled to fly or the law of the country where 
the aircraft is registered. 
 
 2. The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from acts occurring in an 
area not subject to the territorial sovereignty 
of any State shall be the law of the country 
with which the case is most closely connected.
 
 
 
 
[Article 4(2) DP 
 
If there is no connection with a specific 
country or if there is a connection with several 
countries, the applicable law shall be that of 
the country with which the case is most 
closely connected.] 
Article 11c  – Supplementary rule 
 
If the connecting factors named in Articles 3 
to 8, 10 or 10b are not discernible or point to 
the laws of several countries, the applicable 
law shall be the law of the country with which 
the case is most closely connected. 
 
 
 
                                                          
52  See comment no. 6 on art. 3 DP, supra. 
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COMMENTS  ON  ARTICLES 11b and 11c 
 
1. Revision of basic structure. Art. 4 is both misworded and misplaced, but not entirely 
misconceived. It only needs severe re-editing. To serve its function as a general 
supplementary rule properly, it ought to be placed in chapter 3 of Title II on common rules 
applicable to non-contractual obligations of all kinds. Further on, the heading of art. 4 DP 
("Areas not subject to territorial sovereignty") does not cover the content of art. 4(2) DP 
which contains an auxiliary rule supplementing the other conflict rules in case they do not 
provide for an unambiguous reference of a given case to a single national law; this rule is 
unrelated to the particular problems of locations not subject to national sovereignty.  The 
proper solution is that the content of art. 4 DP should be split into two different articles. 
2. Supplementary rule. Art. 11c of the Hamburg alternative proposal replaces the 
misworded art. 4(2) DP. To oblige judges and lawyers to search for the closest connection if 
there is no connection at all, as art. 4(2) DP urges to do, would pose an eternal conundrum. 
The proposed art. 11c reflects the concept and falls back on the general rule of looking for the 
closest connection once more. Secondary connecting factors not named in arts. 3 to 8, 10 or 
10b might come in to break the deadlock if the primary connecting factors, with equal weight, 
point to the laws of different countries. However, art. 11c does not apply if there exists a 
reasonable possibility for a ranking of the named connecting factors, allowing one connecting 
factor to prevail over the others. Nor does art. 11c apply to multistate torts; here, the 
connecting factors named in the preceding articles may equally point “to the laws of several 
countries”, but with regard to different fact patterns. Art. 11c presupposes an ambiguous 
reference with regard to one and the same fact situation. 
3. Vessels and aircraft. The proposed art. 11b(1) is an appropriate rule for any act 
occurring aboard ships and aircraft outside territorial realms of any State53, while art. 4 DP 
does not address these cases clearly. It should be required that the ship is entitled to fly the 
flag of the State in question. Thus cases where ships fly flags without the permission of the 
respective State are subject not to paragraph 1 but to paragraph 2 of art. 11b (which does not 
automatically exlude the unlawfully flown flag from being taken into consideration). 
However, the rule now expressed in art. 11b(1) must not be intermingled with other 
considerations as it unfortunately happened in Article 4(1) DP. Not every act occurring 
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outside the realm of genuinely terriorial reach happens to occur aboard a ship or aircraft. 
Hence, art. 4(1) DP is incomprehensive and misguiding at the same time. 
4. Other cases. Art. 11b(2) of the Hamburg alternative proposal provides a supplementary 
or auxiliary rule for the unlikely, but not wholly impossible case that the act occurs outside 
the territory of any State and not aboard a ship or aircraft. A possible example could be a 
collision on the High Seas or an act committed on an oil drilling rig outside any territorial 
waters (if the oil drilling right cannot be attributed to a „Flag State“ by means of registration) 
or in Antarctica. In this rare event one cannot do better than to fall back on the general rule 
backing private international law, and to look for the closest connection.54 This solution gains 
some support from art. 4(1) and (2) 3rd sentence of the Rome Convention. However, 
paragraph 2 does not apply if the injury is sustained in the coastal zone or in waters above the 
continental shelf. In these events the law of the relevant coastal state ought to be applied.55  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
53 Cf. Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main February 13, 1997, Transportrecht 1998, 62; Bernd 
von Hoffmann, in: von Staudinger, BGB. Articles 38-42 EGBGB, 14th ed. Berlin 2001, Art. 
40 EGBGB note 36. 
54 This might result in the application of the law of the country where the company running or 
controlling the installation has its central administration or its statutory seat; Bernd von 
Hoffmann, in: von Staudinger, BGB. Articles 38-42 EGBGB, 14th ed. Berlin 2001, Art. 40 
EGBGB note 36. Where territorial bonds of actions or objects fail and do not establish some 
kind of localization, personal bonds (i.e. bonds connecting a relevant person with a certain 
country) generally might provide a feasible solution; compare PeterMankowski, Das Internet 
im Internationalen Vertrags- und Deliktsrecht, RabelsZ 63 (1999), 203, at 265 et seq. 
55 Compare ECJ, judgment of 27 February 2002 (case C-37/00), Herbert Weber v. Universal 
Ogden Services Ltd. (concerning Article 5 no. 1 sentences 2 and 3 of the Brussels 
Convention), Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2002, 220. 
23.09.02 12:55 46
 
Article 12 – Mandatory rules Article 12 – Internationally mandatory 
rules 
 1.  When applying, under this Regulation, 
the law of a country, effect may be given to 
the mandatory rules of the laws of another 
country with which the situation has a close 
connection, if and in so far as, under the law 
of the latter country, those rules must be 
applied whatever the law applicable to the 
case. In considering whether to give effect to 
these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to 
their nature and purpose and to the 
consequences of their application or non-
application. 
Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the 
application of the mandatory rules of the law 
of the forum irrespective of the law otherwise 
applicable to the non-contractual obligation. 
2.  Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict 
the application of the internationally 
mandatory rules of the law of the forum 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to 
the non-contractual obligation. 
C O M M E N T S 
Art. 12 DP reserves the application of those rules of the lex fori which are deemed to be 
internationally mandatory, hence the change of title suggested by the Hamburg Group. While 
art. 12 DP corresponds to art. 7(2) of the Rome Convention, the special reference to 
internationally mandatory rules of a foreign law contained in art. 7(1) of the Rome 
Convention is addressed in the EC Draft Proposal. The Hamburg Group acknowledges that 
the need for such a rule, which is undisputed in contract law, may not be quite the same with 
regard to non-contractual obligations. However, the former sweeping rejection of foreign 
mandatory rules has given way to a more differentiated assessment. The rapid increase in the 
number of international contacts favours the insight that legal systems have to take into 
consideration not only traditional private law of foreign countries, but also certain mandatory 
provisions of those states. Against this background, the elimination of art. 7(1) of the Rome 
Convention from the EC Draft Proposal is a regrettable step backward. 
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Article 13 – Rules of conduct and safety Article 13 – Binding local regulations of 
traffic and like conduct 
Whatever may be the applicable law, in 
determining liability account shall be taken of 
the rules of conduct and safety which were in 
force at the place and time of the act giving 
rise to non-contractual liability. 
In determining liability under the applicable 
law, account shall be taken of binding local 
regulations of traffic or like conduct which 
are of general application and were in force  
at the place and time of the conduct giving 
rise to non-contractual liability. 
C O M M E N T S 
Art. 13 DP follows the model of art. 7 of the Hague Convention on the law applicable to 
traffic accidents of 197156 which in turn responds to the obvious need to take into account the 
traffic regulations of the country where the accident occurred even if the non-contractual 
liability arising from that accident is subject to a different law. For example, when assessing 
the mutual claims of two Frenchmen involved in a road accident in the U.K., the court, in 
applying French law, cannot disregard that driving on the left-hand side is prescribed by 
English law, i.e. by so-called local data. The EC Draft Proposal has extended the scope of this 
rule to non-contractual liability in general, which reveals the uncertainties inherent in this rule 
and the threat it presents for the operation of the other conflict rules of the EC Draft Proposal. 
To put it in general terms, it could be said that conduct as a connecting factor would first be 
thrown out by the door of art. 3(1) DP but return by the window of art. 13 DP. This can be 
illustrated by examples relating to the special conflict rules of the EC Draft Proposal some of 
which may be regarded as special imprints of the general rule referring to the place of injury. 
For example, take the connecting factor of the target market under art. 6 DP and suppose that 
a trader established in country A offers goods to be sold in a clearance sale in country B; 
assume further that the clearance sale is illegal under the laws of B while it is lawful in A. The 
seller’s competitors in the market of B who seek an injunction against the sale and damages 
for loss of business will be unsure whether the court will grant the claim applying the laws of 
B under art. 6 DP or whether it will dismiss the claim on the basis of art. 13 DP. This situation 
may be similar with regard to defamatory statements in the press: would a court rely on art. 13 
DP to apply the law of the country of publication which perhaps protects the freedom of 
speech of the media in a very generous way? Or would it take recourse to the law of the 
victim’s residence under art. 7 DP? An other example would be the pollution of a river in a 
                                                          
56 Convention on the  Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, Done at The Hague on 4 May 1971, 
in: Hague Conference on Private International Law, Collection of Conventions (1951-1980) 
142. 
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down-stream country which is caused by a dump in an up-stream state and which is permitted 
by an administrative licence of that country? Would the judge dismiss the claims based upon 
the law of the down-stream country applicable under art. 8 DP because s/he has to take into 
account the law of the up-stream state under art. 13 DP? 
The examples clearly demonstrate that art. 13 DP is too wide. The language of art. 13 DP 
furthers the (wrong) impression that the rules of conduct and safety entirely replace the 
applicable law governing liability. The legitimate aim of the article is, however, only to give 
adequate weight to binding local regulations within the liability rules of the applicable law. In 
road traffic, where this conflict rule has been conceived, the “rules of conduct and safety” 
mean the binding local traffic regulations (speed limits, traffic signs etc.). They are expected 
to be observed by everyone participating in public traffic because those rules are necessary 
and of general application. There is, therefore, hardly any doubt that the prescriptive or 
prohibitive rules of the place of acting have to be taken into account by the judge, when 
applying the law that governs the claim as such. Otherwise the person held responsible would 
be pushed into a conflict of duties arising under the laws of different countries. However, the 
recognition of local regulations at the expense of the otherwise applicable law must be strictly 
confined to rules of the character of local traffic rules that prohibit or prescribe a certain 
conduct. This becomes particularly clear when permissions or permissive rules and their 
extraterritorial effects are at stake. When the applicable law provides for liability a permission 
granted in one country or a conduct allowed there cannot and should not serve as justification 
to injure persons in another country. A state and its residents cannot expect the home rules to 
be taken into account, if the behaviour permitted there injures people in foreign countries. 
There may be a case for the respect of such rules within the European single market under 
art. 23 DP, but this depends on the subject and cannot be extended to the relations with third 
states. The Hamburg Group therefore proposes to restrict the rule contained in art. 13 DP to 
binding local regulations such as the local traffic rules.   
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Article 14 – Direct action against the insurer of the person liable 
1.  Persons who have suffered injury or 
damage shall have a right of direct action 
against the insurer of the person liable if they 
have such a right under the law applicable to 
the non-contractual obligation. 
The injured person’s right of direct action 
against the insurer of the person liable is 
determined by the law which is applicable to 
the non-contractual obligation or by the law 
governing the contract of insurance, 
whichever is more favorable to the injured 
person.  
2.  If this law does not provide any such 
right, it may be exercised if it is provided by 
the law governing the contract of insurance. 
See preceding paragraph 
C O M M E N T S 
Art. 14 DP is drafted as a substantive rule that would appear as an alien element in an 
instrument on private international law; the Hamburg Group therefore suggests to adjust its 
style to other provisions.  
As to the substance, it appears that art. 14 DP purports to favour the victim by allowing 
him/her to base a direct claim either on the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation or 
on the law governing the contract of insurance. However, this favour is inconsistent and half-
hearted, since the second option, i.e. the law governing the contract of insurance, is only open 
to the victim, if the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation “does not provide any 
such right”. It necessarily follows that the former option is unavailable, if the law applicable 
to the non-contractual obligation provides for a direct action within certain limits or 
restrictions. The technique of the alternative availability of two national laws, as suggested by 
the Hamburg alternative proposal, appears to implement the intended favour of the victim 
more thoroughly.  
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 Article 14a -  Voluntary assignment 
 1.   The mutual obligations of assignor and 
assignee under a voluntary assignment of a 
right against another person ('the debtor') 
shall be governed by the law which applies to 
the contract between the assignor and 
assignee. 
 2.  The law governing the right to which the 
assignment relates shall determine its 
assignability, the relationship between the 
assignee and the debtor, the conditions under 
which the assignment can be invoked against 
the debtor and any question whether the 
debtor's obligations have been discharged. 
 3.  Validity and Effects of the assignment 
with regard to third parties are governed by 
the law of the assignor’s habitual residence. 
 
Article 15 – Subrogation Article 15 – Subrogation and multitude of 
debtors 
1.  Where a person (“the creditor”) has a 
non-contractual claim upon another (“the 
debtor”), and a third person has a duty to 
satisfy the creditor, or has in fact satisfied the 
creditor in discharge of that duty, the law 
which governs the third person's duty to 
satisfy the creditor shall determine whether 
the third person is entitled to exercise against 
the debtor the rights which the creditor had 
against the debtor under the law governing 
their relationship in whole or in part. 
1.  Where a person (“the creditor”) has a 
non-contractual claim upon another (“the 
debtor”), and a third person has a duty to 
satisfy the creditor, or has in fact satisfied the 
creditor in discharge of that duty, the law 
which governs the third person's duty to 
satisfy the creditor shall determine whether 
the third person is entitled to exercise against 
the debtor the rights which the creditor had 
against the debtor under the law governing 
their relationship in whole or in part.  The law 
governing the debtor`s obligation remains 
applicable to its enforcement and to the 
debtor’s protection, excluding the question 
whether the right can be subject to 
subrogation at all. 
2.  The same rule shall apply where several 
persons are subject to the same claim and one 
of them has satisfied the creditor. 
2.  Where several persons are subject to the 
same creditor’s claims arising from the same 
fact pattern, and one of them has satisfied the 
creditor of these claims, the law governing 
this debtor’s obligation also governs that 
person’s right to contribution from the other 
persons. Where the law governing those other 
persons’ obligations towards the creditor 
contains rules deemed specifically to protect 
them from liability, those rules are equally 
applicable against the claim for contribution. 
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C O M M E N T S   O N   ARTICLES 14a, 15 
1.  The Concept of Art. 15 DP. Art. 15 DP does not only deal with “subrogation”, as its 
overly narrow title suggests, but with several cases where one party fulfils the creditor’s claim 
and then, because of this, demands reimbursement or contribution from someone else. The 
difference between paragraphs 1 and 2 is in the relation between the obligations of the party 
who pays to the creditor, and the party asked for contribution or indemnity. Consequently, the 
typical cases arising under art. 15(1) and (2) DP respectively are different. 
Paragraph 1 regulates the case in which the third person acquires the right the previous 
creditor had against the debtor. The reason for this typically is that the third person's and the 
debtor’s obligations are not on equal footing, but the debtor’s obligation is primary to the one 
of the third person that actually pays. The typical case in the law of torts is that of an insurer 
who pays because of a contractual obligation towards the debtor, irrespective of whether the 
tort victim has a direct claim against the insurer or not. 
Paragraph 2, to the contrary, deals with the case of equally obligated debtors (“same claim”), 
one of whom has paid and now asks for contribution from the other. The technical basis for 
this claim is irrelevant. The typical case in the law of torts is that of several tortfeasors being 
jointly (in a non-technical sense) liable to the tort victim and one of them satisfying the 
victim’s claim. 
Art. 15 DP is almost identical to art. 13 of the Rome Convention. This is justified in part by 
the parallel structure and is in accordance also with the proposal of GEDIP. Yet some 
problems are specific to non-contractual obligations or at least rest on different 
considerations. More importantly, a new regulation offers the possibility of improvements or 
at least clarifications.  
Missing from art. 15 DP are two bigger questions. First, the proposal, unlike the Rome 
Convention (see art. 12), fails to address in any provision the voluntary assignment of claims. 
Secondly, like the Rome Convention, the proposal does not deal with the case in which the 
person asking for contribution or indemnity has paid without an own obligation. This is 
arguably a case of restitution (negotiorum gestio) and should be regulated there (see art. 
10b(2) of the Hamburg alternative proposal). 
2.  Voluntary assignment. Although the assignment of non-contractual rights is not 
infrequent, voluntary assignment is not regulated in the proposal. Further, whether the 
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assignment of non-contractual claims falls under art. 12 of the Rome Convention is disputed 
and unclear. Arguably, due to the language of art. 1(1) of the Rome Convention, only the 
assignment of rights from contractual obligations is therein addressed. Further doubts arise 
because art. 9 no. 6 DP specifically subjects assignability to the law determined under the 
draft proposal and thereby repeats part of art. 12(2) of the Rome Convention. This invites the 
unwelcome argument that, e contrario, the other questions under art. 12(2) of the Rome 
Convention do not, at least automatically, fall under the EC Draft Proposal.  
It is proposed to copy art. 12 of the Rome Convention into this regulation for purposes of 
clarification. In this respect, a problem left open in the Rome Convention should be regulated 
as well, namely the question of the law determining the validity of the assignment with regard 
to third parties, and most notably the creditors of the debtor and of the assignor. Several 
connecting factors have been proposed in the discussion: the law applicable to the assigned 
right itself, the assignor’s or the assignee’s habitual residence, or even the law applicable to 
the assignment contract itself, enabling assignor and assignee to determine that law with 
regard to third parties. While no clear convergence towards one particular solution is visible 
thus far, the question should, because of its importance, not be left open. There appears to be a 
growing tendency towards either application of the law governing the assigned right, or of the 
assignor’s habitual residence at the time when the assignment is entered into. This latter 
solution also seems to be in accordance with the relevant interests, mainly because the 
assignor and therefore the applicable law are recognizable to all parties alike both before and 
after the assignment takes place.57 In the opinion of the Hamburg Group, this should be 
regulated in a new paragraph 3, which can also serve as a model once the Rome Convention is 
replaced by a regulation. 
3.  Basic Approach of Art. 15(1) DP. Although the wording of the provision appears 
somewhat clumsy and unnecessarily complicated, it should not be altered at this stage due to 
the parallel wording of art. 13(1) of the Rome Convention. Applicability of the law governing 
the third person’s liability to compensation appears plausible and is in accordance with major 
legislation and doctrinal writers. It is justified by the close connection between the third 
party’s obligation to compensate on the one hand, and his/her interest in having recourse 
against the debtor who is primarily responsible on the other. 
                                                          
57  See in more detail Eva-Maria Kieninger, Das Statut der Forderungsabtretung im Verhältnis 
zu Dritten: RabelsZ 62 (1998) 678. 
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The proposed art. 15(1), like art. 13(1) of the Rome Convention, only regulates the case in 
which the third person acquires the creditor’s right (cessio legis), or the right to enforce that 
right (subrogation). As in art. 13 of the Rome Convention, cessio legis must be considered to 
be included (as the German version suggests). Other cases of recourse outside subrogation 
and  cessio legis are different because the particular right against the debtor, or the right to 
enforce it, is not transferred. It is therefore justified to keep these cases outside the scope of 
this rule; they should be dealt with in the context of the chapter on restitution including 
negotiorum gestio (see art. 10b of the Hamburg alternative proposal). 
An insurer has the duty to indemnify the insured; this (usually contractual) duty determines 
the law applicable to the recourse under art. 15(1). This should also be understood to be the 
case where the tort victim has a direct claim against the insurer. While one might argue, 
technically, that in such a case the insurer pays in discharge of a duty towards the victim, the 
underlying duty stems from its contract with the insured. Because this is also the law most 
predictable for both insurer and insured and because the victim's interests are not affected, it is 
therefore more legitimate than the law governing the victim’s direct claim against the insurer. 
It seems unnecessary to change the wording in order to make this clear, as long as such an 
understanding is agreed to underlie the provision. 
4.  The debtor’s protection. An unregulated question is the impact of the law governing the 
debtor’s obligation to the creditor. Clearly, the obligation is enforced according to the law 
governing that obligation, after it has been transferred or subrogated. Other aspects are less 
clear. 
The rule is silent with regard to the debtor’s protection, although there is virtual agreement 
that the debtor’s position should not be worsened by the cessio legis/subrogation, and that 
therefore specific rules for his/her protection under the law governing his obligation remain 
applicable. This should be made clear, as e.g. in art. 146(2) of the Swiss Law on Private 
International Law.58 
Finally, like the Rome Convention, the proposal does not make clear whether the law 
governing the debtor’s obligation should also apply to the question of whether the right can be 
subrogated at all. If it did apply, a situation could arise in which, because of different 
applicable laws, the third person would be obliged to pay, but would not receive the right 
                                                          
58  Les dispositions du droit régissant la créance qui sont destinées à protéger le débiteur sont 
réservées, cf. supra, at n. 6. 
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against the debtor in return. This would be unfair as against the third person, because that 
person’s obligation to pay and his/her right to recourse are intimately connected, and because 
the debtor does not require this degree of protection. On the other hand, the mere change in 
the position of the creditor is not detrimental to the debtor, as long as s/he maintains the same 
protection as s/he had against the old debtor. It is therefore justified to treat provisions that 
restrict transferability differently from provisions for the debtor’s protection.  
5.  Redrafting of Art. 15(2) DP. There are several problems with art. 15(2) DP. First, it 
suffers from the same unclear formulation as its model, art. 13(2) of the Rome Convention. 
“The same rule” may be sufficiently clear, although subrogation is a different case from the 
one regulated here. The formulation “the same claim”, however, has already led to dispute in 
art. 13(2) of the Rome Convention; the chance should not be missed to reach more clarity 
here. Also, it is unclear what “the same claim” means. 
In its content, art. 15(2) DP appears justified, although the situation dealt with here is 
substantially different from that of art. 15(1) DP. Problems may arise in the case of different 
laws governing the obligations of different tortfeasors, a situation favoured by conflicts rules 
allowing for different connecting factors apart from just the place of the injury.  
Application of the law under which the tortfeasor seeking contribution was obliged to 
compensate the victim appears justified. S/he is in a worse position than the other joint 
tortfeasors, because s/he has already paid and now runs the risk of having to seek 
contribution. It appears to give him/her at least the privilege to see “his/her” law applied to 
that contribution. As a result, though, a tortfeasor may be confronted with a claim to 
contribution under a law different from the one governing his/her own obligation towards the 
tort victim. Some argue against this possibility. They are afraid of a race between the 
tortfeasors towards compensation, because the one compensating the victim first would 
thereby secure applicability of his/her own law to contribution. However, this argument is 
weak. To the contrary, a race between several tortfeasors may even be desirable, because it is 
in the victim’s interest. 
Some argue for a general rule under which contribution should always be regulated by the law 
of the place of the tort. The argument is that different laws will govern the several tortfeasors’ 
obligations only where for at least for one of them the place of the tort, as the general criterion 
to determine the applicable law, is replaced by another specific criterion. It is argued that such 
a criterion, making the relation between that tortfeasor and the victim special, should be 
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irrelevant for the other tortfeasors, and that the lex loci delicti as the “normal” law should 
continue to govern the claims between the tortfeasors. Yet even though lex loci delicti may 
still be the general rule in the draft proposal, it is hardly more than a residual rule, and the 
exceptions are so numerous that the argument seems weak. 
Structurally, while the obligation of the person compensating the creditor is typically one of 
tort law, the question as to his/her recourse against the other tortfeasors is one of restitution. 
This may look like an argument against the application of the law governing his obligation 
towards the victim, and one might argue that the applicable law should be determined 
differently. This is, however, unconvincing, at least as a general rule. Contribution between 
several debtors is only a question of distributing non-contractual liability towards the creditor, 
it is so closely related to that liability that applying a different law normally appears artificial 
and may lead to problems. One might be inclined to argue differently if there is a special 
contractual relation between the several tortfeasors. Take the example of several directors of a 
company jointly liable for damages inflicted upon a third person, only one of whom 
compensates that person. Seemingly, the law governing the company should also determine 
claims to contribution. Yet, while it is true that that special relation should normally prevail, 
this need not – and should not generally – be done with choice of law instruments. Just as in 
other cases in which there is concurrence of different claims underlying different laws (e.g. a 
contractual and a tortious claim), the question can be dealt with more flexibly in the 
application of the different substantive laws determined by the different choice of law 
provisions.59 
Finally, neither this proposal, nor art. 13(2) of the Rome Convention, apply, on their faces, to 
situations in which both contractual and non-contractual claims are involved. Because the 
rules are, substantively, the same, however, this situation should not deserve its own conflicts 
rule. 
6.  Escape Clause. While these rules should provide legal security and just results for most 
cases, situations of more than two persons like this one are particularly inapt for a priori rules 
governing all imaginable and unimaginable cases. This is true in particular for the case of 
art. 15(2) if the several tortfeasors’ liability to the victim looks different under different laws 
(“Gestörter Gesamtschuldnerausgleich”). It is therefore desirable to have an escape clause 
(see art. 11a of the Hamburg alternative proposal). 
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Article 16 – Formal validity 
A unilateral act intended to have legal effect 
and relating to a non-contractual obligation is 
formally valid if it satisfies the formal 
requirements of the law which governs the 
non-contractual obligation in question or the 
law of the country in which this act is done. 
No changes 
Article 17 – Burden of proof, etc 
1.  The law governing non-contractual 
obligations under this Regulation applies to 
the extent that it contains, in matters of non-
contractual obligations, rules which raise 
presumptions of law or determine the burden 
of proof. 
No changes 
2.  Acts intended to have legal effect may be 
proved by any mode of proof recognised by 
the law of the forum or by any of the laws 
referred to in Article 16 under which that act 
is formally valid, provided that such mode of 
proof can be administered by the forum. 
No changes 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
59  See Manfred Wandt, Zum Rückgriff im internationalen Privatrecht: Zeitschrift für 
Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 86 (1987) 272-313 (287-289). 
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Title III   -   GENERAL  PROVISIONS 
Article 18 – Habitual residence 
1.  For bodies corporate or unincorporate, 
the central administration shall be considered 
to be the habitual residence. 
No changes 
2.  Where the act giving rise to the non-
contractual obligation is perpetrated or 
suffered in the exercise of a trade or a 
profession, the principal place of business 
shall be considered to be the habitual 
residence. Where there is more than one place 
of business, the one at which the harmful 
event was perpetrated or suffered shall be 
considered to be the habitual residence. 
No changes 
Article 19 – Exclusion of renvoi 
The application of the law of any country 
specified by this Regulation means the 
application of the rules of law in force in that 
country other than its rules of private 
international law. 
No changes 
 
Article 20 – “Ordre public” 
The application of a rule of the law of any 
country specified by this Regulation may be 
refused only if such application is manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy (“ordre 
public”) of the forum. 
No changes 
 
Article 21 – No retrospective effect 
This Regulation shall apply to non-contractual 
obligations deriving from acts occurring after 
its entry into force. 
No changes 
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Article 22 – States with more than one legal system 
1.  Where a State comprises several 
territorial units, each of which has its own 
rules of law in respect of non-contractual 
obligations, each territorial unit shall be 
considered as a country for the purposes of 
identifying the law applicable under this 
Regulation. 
No changes 
2.  A State within which different territorial 
units have their own rules of law in respect of 
non-contractual obligations shall not be bound 
to apply this Regulation to conflicts solely 
between the laws of such units. 
No changes 
Article 23 - Relationship with other provisions of Community law 
1.  This Regulation shall not prejudice the 
application of provisions which are or will be 
contained in the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities or in acts of the 
institutions of the European Communities 
which: 
1.  This Regulation shall not prejudice the 
application of provisions which are or will be 
contained in the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities or in acts of the 
institutions of the European Communities or 
national provisions adopted for their 
implementation which: 
• in relation to particular matters, lay down 
choice of law rules relating to non-
contractual obligations; or  
• lay down rules which apply, irrespective 
of the national law governing the non-
contractual obligation in question by 
virtue of this Regulation; or  
• prevent application of a provision or 
provisions of the law of the forum or of 
the law designated by this Regulation. 
• in relation to particular matters, lay down 
choice of law rules relating to non-
contractual obligations; or  
• lay down rules which apply, irrespective 
of the national law governing the non-
contractual obligation in question by 
virtue of this Regulation; or  
• prevent application of a provision or 
provisions of the law of the forum or of 
the law designated by this Regulation. 
2.  This regulation shall not prejudice the 
application of Community instruments which, 
in relation to particular matters and in areas 
coordinated by such instruments, subject 
services to the laws of the Member State 
where the service-provider is established and, 
in the area coordinated, allow restrictions on 
freedom to provide services originating in 
another Member State only in limited 
circumstances. 
2.  This regulation shall not prejudice the 
application of Community instruments or 
national provisions adopted for their 
implementation which, in relation to particular 
matters and in areas coordinated by such 
instruments, subject services to the laws of the 
Member State where the service-provider is 
established and, in the area coordinated, allow 
restrictions on freedom to provide services 
originating in another Member State only in 
limited circumstances. 
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C O M M E N T S 
Art. 23 DP deals with very heterogeneous problems: the relation between the EC Draft 
Proposal and other conflict rules on non-contractual obligations contained in instruments of 
secondary Community law (paragraph 1, 1st point); the respect of internationally mandatory 
rules of Community law (paragraph 1, 2nd point); the relation between the private 
international law rules contained in the EC Draft Proposal and some directly applicable rules 
of primary Community law (paragraph 1, 3rd point); and the respect of Community law 
instruments which prescribe the country-of-origin principle for some services (paragraph 2). 
The mix of problems creates a rather incoherent piece of legislation. The only common 
feature of the various issues treated in this article is the relation with other Community law 
instruments.  
The first point of paragraph 1 is an expression of the general principle lex specialis derogat 
legi generali. Rules of this type are usually allocated among the “general provisions” of 
statutes. This is different for the second point of paragraph 1. The regard for of mandatory 
rules irrespective of the national law governing the non-contractual obligation would have to 
be classified in connection with art. 12 DP in the Third Chapter of Title II on “common 
rules”. One might even question the need for art. 23(1) 2nd point DP as an additional rule next 
to art. 12 DP. The future regulation as such will only be applied by courts of Member States; 
it is submitted that Community instruments which lay down rules that apply irrespective of 
the national law governing the non-contractual obligation be included in the “mandatory rules 
of the law of the forum” for the purposes of art. 12 DP. The Community instruments referred 
to in art. 23(1) 3rd point DP, which prevent the application of a provision of the applicable 
law, are essentially some directly applicable provisions of the Treaty. In substance, art. 23(1) 
3rd point DP simply is declaratory of the primacy of the Treaty and in particular of some of its 
directly applicable provisions such as the basic freedoms. Although such a reminder is rather 
unusual in Community instruments of secondary legislation, it might be useful in this context, 
since the addressees of the future regulation are thus invited to consider the impact that some 
provisions of the Treaty may have on the conflict of laws. 
Art. 23(2) DP apparently refers to Directive 2000/31 on electronic commerce in the internal 
market.60 It should be recalled that the meaning of that directive is far from clear as far as 
                                                          
60  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8.6.2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on Electronic Commerce), O.J.E.C.  L 178, 17/07/2000, 1-16. 
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private international law is concerned.61 It is difficult to see how the reservation contained in 
art. 23(2) DP can clarify the purpose and content of that very unfortunate directive. As far as 
specific and limited subject matters such as advertising are concerned, it would rather appear 
appropriate to adopt a conflict rule openly connected to the country-of-origin principle as an 
exception to art. 6 DP (see art. 6(2) of the Hamburg alternative proposal).  
Both paragraphs of art. 23 DP refer to acts or instruments of the Community and apparently 
purport to include directives. Since directives lack a direct horizontal effect, they are not 
applicable as such in private law litigation. The Commission should therefore consider adding 
the reference to the national provisions adopted for the implementation of the directives which 
is contained in the Hamburg alternative proposal.  
 
Article 24 – Relationship with existing 
international conventions 
Article 24 – Relationship with international 
conventions 
This Regulation shall not prejudice the 
application of international conventions to 
which the Member States are party when this 
Regulation is adopted and which, in relation 
to particular matters, lay down choice of law 
rules relating to non-contractual obligations. 
This Regulation shall not prejudice, as far as 
the relation to states that are not members of 
the European Community is concerned, the 
application of international conventions to 
which one or more of the Member States are 
or may become party and which, in relation to 
particular matters, lay down choice of law 
rules relating to non-contractual obligations. 
C O M M E N T S  
According to art. 24 DP, existing conventions to which the Member States are parties shall 
not be touched by the regulation. For some Member States, this takes such important areas as 
traffic accidents and product liability out of the scope of the proposal. This reduction in scope 
is undesirable, because it maintains discrepancies between the Member States’ conflicts rules 
in important areas, thereby depriving the regulation of much of its unifying effect. A similar 
reservation may have been necessary for the Rome Convention (see its art. 21), which, as a 
convention between sovereign states, stood on the same level as those other conventions. 
With regard to the new Regulation which will be enacted as a Community act it is inadequate 
and, in its scope, unnecessary. Under art. 307 EC, certain treaties to which the Member States 
                                                          
61  See Peter Mankowski, Das Herkunftslandprinzip als Internationales Privatrecht der e-
commerce-Richtlinie: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 100 (2001), at 137 et 
seq. 
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are parties take priority over obligations imposed upon them by Community law only with 
regard to third States. It follows and is common ground that Community law prevails over 
treaties concluded by the Member States inter se. This takes account of the Community’s 
legitimate interest in regulating internal matters, while other states’ interests are not infringed 
absent a relevant connection to them. It is therefore proposed to make an exception for 
existing conventions only insofar as relations to non-Member States are concerned.  
If those Member States that are parties to these conventions strongly favour their content, they 
should rather argue for the inclusion of this content into the proposal instead of an exception 
from its scope of application. This would avoid conflicts between the regulation and those 
conventions. The alternative to fully adopt the content of these conventions into the 
regulation, however, must be rejected. In a possible new discussion of the advantages of these 
conventions it should be kept in mind that several Member States have deliberately refrained 
from becoming parties to these conventions for good reasons. 
Affirming the strict priority of the future Regulation with regard to intra-Community relations 
would, at the same time, allow for more flexibility in respect of future international 
conventions that may be concluded with third States. The need for specific treaties with third 
States may be felt in single Member States only and not by the Community institutions. In 
such situations, art. 24 DP would exclude the Member States from concluding a treaty they 
deem desirable. By allowing for such future treaties as well, the proposal of the Hamburg 
Group opens a gate for specific needs of single Member States without encroaching upon the 
unity of conflict rules in the EC at which the coming Regulation primarily aims. 
A different question arises when the EU itself, at a later stage, wants to become a party to 
conventions in the area of choice of law of non-contractual obligations. In this way, the EU 
could both achieve more unity in worldwide private international law provisions, and it could 
influence the content of these and other conventions in the (re-) negotiations. According to 
general principles, the EU should have the external competence to enter into such agreements 
once it has exercised its competence internally. 
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TITLE IV   -   FINAL  CLAUSES 
Article 25 
This Regulation shall enter into force six 
months after its publication in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities. 
No changes 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States. 
No changes 
 
